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	<title type="text">RIMJIN-GANG</title>
	<subtitle type="text">NEWS FROM INSIDE NORTH KOREA</subtitle>

	<updated>2026-09-11T09:23:42Z</updated>

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			<name>asiapress</name>
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		<title type="html"><![CDATA[Large-Scale Price Investigation Reveals North Korea&#039;s Economy (8): How Much Do State Enterprise Workers Earn? What Can They Buy? Hyperinflation Devastates Wages]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/09/society-economy/price-survey-8/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=8068</id>
		<updated>2026-09-11T09:23:42Z</updated>
		<published>2026-09-11T09:11:08Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" /><category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="North Korea&#039;s Economy Seen Through a Large-Scale Price Survey" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[ASIAPRESS conducted extensive price surveys in four cities across Ryanggang Province and North Hamgyong Province in May …]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/09/society-economy/price-survey-8/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_8069" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8069" style="width: 900px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260910.jpeg"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260910.jpeg" alt="" width="900" height="586" class="size-full wp-image-8069" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260910.jpeg 900w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260910-300x195.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260910-768x500.jpeg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 900px) 100vw, 900px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8069" class="wp-caption-text">Construction workers on a job site. The man on the left is carrying a concrete block. September 2025, Hyesan, photographed from the Chinese side of the border (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>ASIAPRESS conducted extensive price surveys in four cities across Ryanggang Province and North Hamgyong Province in May and June. In the eighth installment of this series, we examine wages at state enterprises. The majority of adult men in North Korea work for state enterprises, and their wages are, in principle, set by the state. But what exactly is this "state-set wage"? What purchasing power does it actually possess? This article explains the latest wage levels and structures. (<em>HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won</em>)</p>
<h2>◆State-Set Wages Become Meaningless</h2>
<p>North Korea has long implemented a system of "state-set wages" in which the state sets wages uniformly according to job type and labor intensity. This system originally presupposed a rationing system in which food, housing, and energy were provided by the state at low prices as compensation for labor—covering not only the worker but also their family members. Medical care and education were free, and simply by holding a job, an entire family could survive on wages. Each workplace had a rank system based on position, and as workers were promoted, their wages increased.</p>
<p>However, the economic collapse of the 1990s changed everything. As the food rationing system essentially collapsed, the country descended into the social chaos and mass starvation that became known as the "Arduous March." When state-set wages could no longer purchase the food needed for survival, the system collapsed entirely, and most people were forced to engage in market activities to survive. Yet the Kim Jong-il regime continued to compel adult men to report to work. This was to maintain control through workplaces. Wages were either not paid at all or paid in meaningless small amounts; food rations were nearly halted as well—a situation that persisted until recently.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8070" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8070" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-20260910.jpeg"><img decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-20260910.jpeg" alt="" width="1000" height="750" class="size-full wp-image-8070" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-20260910.jpeg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-20260910-300x225.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-20260910-768x576.jpeg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8070" class="wp-caption-text">(Reference photo) Chongsu Chemical Factory in Sakchu County, North Pyongan Province. Until a few years before this photograph, it was in ruins, but the exterior was neatly maintained. Whether this reflects concern for China or indicates the factory has resumed operations remains unclear. September 2024, photographed from the Chinese side of the border (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆A Brief Relief Before Collapse</h2>
<p>In late 2023, a major change occurred. The Kim Jong-un regime raised state enterprise wages across the board by more than tenfold. Wages that had been approximately 1,500–2,500 won jumped dramatically to 35,000–70,000 won (described below). Additionally, workers themselves were provided with approximately 5 kilograms of grain per month free of charge. The authorities claimed that with the increased wages, families could now afford to purchase food.</p>
<p>※ Beginning around January 2023, the sale of grain in markets was prohibited, and grain could only be purchased from state grain distribution stores.<br />
※ 10,000 North Korean won equals approximately 0.15USD (as of August 28, 2026).</p>
<p>The regime's policy of raising state-set wages by more than tenfold shocked locals. The regime's plan was to return to the pre-1990s model: by simply holding a job, people could make a living on state-set wages.</p>
<p>There was initial success. Taking early October 2023, just before the wage increase, as an example, ASIAPRESS surveys showed that white rice cost 6,800 won per kilogram and corn cost 3,200 won per kilogram. In other words, workers at that time could not even afford one kilogram of corn on their wages. However, shortly after the increase, in early January 2024, assuming a wage of 50,000 won, workers could purchase 8.8 kilograms of white rice or 16.1 kilograms of corn.</p>
<p>While this was insufficient for an entire family, compared with thirty years during which wages had been completely meaningless, the measure appeared groundbreaking. With the coronavirus pandemic having severely restricted individual economic activities and people no longer able to engage freely in market activities as before, there was a sense of relief among the population that they could at least survive for the time being.</p>
<h2>◆Hyperinflation Destroys the Plan</h2>
<p>But that relief was short-lived. Prices at grain distribution stores began to skyrocket. As mentioned repeatedly throughout this series, the hyperinflation of the past three years has turned the Kim Jong-un regime's new "livable wage" system into bubbles overnight. Comparing prices between shortly after the increase and the present (August 28, 2026), white rice has surged 6.5-fold and corn has soared 5.5-fold.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8071" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8071" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/003-e-20260911.jpg"><img decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/003-e-20260911.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="632" class="size-full wp-image-8071" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/003-e-20260911.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/003-e-20260911-300x190.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/003-e-20260911-768x485.jpg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8071" class="wp-caption-text">Food price trends from January 2023 to June 2026. As of late August, corn prices had doubled compared with June prices. (ASIAPRESS Survey)</figcaption></figure>
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			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>洪麻里</name>
					</author>

		<title type="html"><![CDATA[A Large-Scale Price Survey Examining the North Korean Economy (7): Are State Enterprises Actually Producing? &quot;Sluggish Exports Continue&quot; &quot;No One Buys What We Make&quot;—Provincial Factories Seek Outlets in &quot;Side Businesses&quot;]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/09/society-economy/price-survey-7/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=8055</id>
		<updated>2026-09-11T09:02:16Z</updated>
		<published>2026-09-09T01:27:12Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" /><category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="North Korea&#039;s Economy Seen Through a Large-Scale Price Survey" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[In the fifth installment of this series, we reported on the reality of the domesticization of industrial products being …]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/09/society-economy/price-survey-7/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_8056" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8056" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2_manpo202410.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="750" class="size-full wp-image-8056" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2_manpo202410.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2_manpo202410-300x225.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/2_manpo202410-768x576.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8056" class="wp-caption-text">A limestone or cement factory. Aging is visible at a glance, though it appears to be in operation. September 2024, Manpo City, Jagang Province, photographed from the Chinese side of the border (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>In the fifth installment of this series, we reported on the reality of the domesticization of industrial products being promoted by the Kim Jong-un regime. But are the factories themselves actually operating properly? Provincial factories have seen their management authority significantly expanded under the "enterprise responsibility management system," yet they struggle with sluggish sales and are turning to manufacturing non-standard products or dispatching workers in search of alternative revenue streams. The following account comes from multiple reporting partners residing in Ryanggang Province who were interviewed during the large-scale price survey conducted in May and June. <em>(HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)</em></p>
<h2>◆Two Types of State Enterprises</h2>
<p>Let us begin with a definition of terms. Currently, state enterprises fall into two broad categories. One type consists of enterprises or factories that operate according to state production targets set by the government. These are generally referred to as "state factories" within North Korea. They operate under the same socialist planned-economy model as before, and examples include large-scale mining operations and coal mines, such as the iron mines of Musan, as well as iron works and cement factories. In Ryanggang Province, the Hyesan Iron Mine corresponds to this category.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8057" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8057" style="width: 850px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/20120323_moosan_00.jpg" alt="" width="850" height="510" class="wp-image-8057" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/20120323_moosan_00.jpg 500w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/20120323_moosan_00-300x180.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 850px) 100vw, 850px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8057" class="wp-caption-text">(Reference photo) Musan Iron Mine as seen from the Chinese side. Asia's largest iron mine with reserves exceeding several billion tons. March 2012, photographed by Nam Jeong-hak (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>The other type consists of enterprises under provincial (do) jurisdiction, generally referred to as "provincial factories." Many such enterprises are responsible for producing goods consumed within the province. These are enterprises or factories that have been granted a certain degree of autonomous management discretion.<br />
This system was introduced under the Kim Jong-un regime. While retaining the obligation to produce according to state targets, enterprises are permitted to independently purchase raw materials, conduct production, and engage in autonomous management—forming contracts with other enterprises and farms for sales. Examples include shoe factories and food processing factories found throughout each province.</p>
<p>Although both are state enterprises, in this article we will distinguish between them as "centrally-managed enterprises (factories)" and "provincially-managed enterprises (factories)." According to multiple reporting partners, a significant gap has emerged in production conditions and wage levels between these two types of factories.</p>
<h2>◆Major Impact from Export Ban: "Unable to Pay Wages to Half Our Workers"</h2>
<p>Let us first examine centrally-managed enterprises. The backbone of North Korea-China trade has long been mineral resources such as coal and iron ore. However, in 2017, following the regime's nuclear test and missile launches, the UN Security Council strengthened economic sanctions and imposed an outright ban on most mineral exports. Many large centrally-managed mining operations and factories fell into severe management difficulties.</p>
<p>A reporting partner in Ryanggang Province explained: <strong>"Both the Hyesan Steel Works and Hyesan Iron Mine depend on exports, so their situation is similar. Because of sanctions, we cannot legally trade with China, and Russia, which has abundant mineral resources of its own, does not import from us, it is said. We smuggle small quantities to China, but we still cannot pay wages to half our workers. The government says it will import equipment and materials to enable worldwide trade, but we continue to wait for when trade with China will resume."</strong><br />
※ Since Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea in June, reports indicate that minerals have begun being formally exported through customs. This matter will be covered in a separate article.</p>
]]></content>
		
			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
					</author>

		<title type="html"><![CDATA[A Large-Scale Price Survey Examining the North Korean Economy (6): Public Utilities—User-Pay System for Electricity, Medical Care, and More; Wealthy Residents Pay Extra for 6 Hours of Daily Electricity]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/09/society-economy/price-survey-6/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=8046</id>
		<updated>2026-09-08T08:14:55Z</updated>
		<published>2026-09-08T08:12:12Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" /><category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="North Korea&#039;s Economy Seen Through a Large-Scale Price Survey" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[ASIAPRESS conducted a large-scale price survey in May and June in four cities in Ryanggang Province and North Hamgyong P…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/09/society-economy/price-survey-6/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_8049" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8049" style="width: 800px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/03-20260904.jpeg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/03-20260904.jpeg" alt="" width="800" height="521" class="size-full wp-image-8049" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/03-20260904.jpeg 800w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/03-20260904-300x195.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/03-20260904-768x500.jpeg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8049" class="wp-caption-text">North Korean electric locomotives. Delays and service suspensions due to power outages are frequent. September 2025, Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, photographed from the Chinese side of the border (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>ASIAPRESS conducted a large-scale price survey in May and June in four cities in Ryanggang Province and North Hamgyong Province. In this sixth installment, we report on public utilities including electricity, water, transportation, and medical costs. We have confirmed that all public services have now become established on the principle of user-pay, and the "free medical care system" that once served as a cornerstone of regime propaganda has transitioned to a fee-based system. (HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)</p>
<h2>◆Additional Fees Pay for 6 Hours of Daily Electricity</h2>
<p>The results of the water and utilities survey are as follows:<br />
<a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-hyou-20260904.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-hyou-20260904.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="480" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-8048" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-hyou-20260904.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-hyou-20260904-300x144.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-hyou-20260904-768x369.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a></p>
<p>The basic electricity rate was the same across all regions at 650 won per month, but in the surveyed areas, the standard residential line ("residential line") supplied only approximately 2–2.5 hours of electricity per day. Households wishing to use electricity for longer periods pay 25,000–30,000 won per month in order to be guaranteed approximately 6 hours of additional daily supply.<br />
※ Industrial facility power supply is called the "industrial line." In the surveyed areas, it has been supplied approximately 10 hours per day since the beginning of the year. The structure prioritizes the "industrial line," forcing residents to bear the inconvenience.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8047" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8047" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260904.jpeg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260904.jpeg" alt="" width="1000" height="610" class="size-full wp-image-8047" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260904.jpeg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260904-300x183.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260904-768x468.jpeg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8047" class="wp-caption-text">An apartment complex plunged into pitch darkness as the sun sets. October 2024, Onsŏng County, North Hamgyong Province, photographed from the Chinese side of the border (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>In affluent residential areas such as cadre apartments, when people wish to use additional electricity, a meter is installed, a neighborhood watch unit’s leader tallies usage, and the user pays the fee to the power distribution bureau (a local agency under the Ministry of Power Industry) by card or cash.</p>
<p>The basic water rate was 500 won per month. Typically, water pressure limits water supply to only the second or third floors in general apartments, but households without water access are still obligated to pay the water fee.<br />
※ 10,000 North Korean won equals approximately 0.15 US dollars (as of August 28, 2026)</p>
<h2>◆Basic Fees Apply Simply by Owning Appliances</h2>
<p>Let us examine electricity charges in more detail. Appliances incur monthly basic fees simply by being owned, varying by type. Additionally, usage-based charges are said to accrue separately.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/04-hyou-20260904.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/04-hyou-20260904.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="604" class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-8050" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/04-hyou-20260904.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/04-hyou-20260904-300x181.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/04-hyou-20260904-768x464.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a></p>
<p>Televisions and irons are generally distributed to ordinary households, but refrigerators and air conditioners are used only by the wealthy, and washing machines are owned by an extremely limited number of households. For reference, our reporting partner in Ryanggang Province owns a television, small refrigerator, DVD player, electric fan, and computer.</p>
]]></content>
		
			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
					</author>

		<title type="html"><![CDATA[A Large-Scale Price Survey Examining the North Korean Economy (5): Domestic Product Promotion in Clothing, Bags, and Snacks... &quot;The Reality Is Semi-Chinese Products&quot; - Candy and Snacks Are Popular]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/09/society-economy/price-survey-5/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=8039</id>
		<updated>2026-09-04T02:34:36Z</updated>
		<published>2026-09-04T02:32:37Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" /><category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="North Korea&#039;s Economy Seen Through a Large-Scale Price Survey" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[In North Korea, products manufactured in factories are generally referred to as "industrial products." The Kim Jong-un r…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/09/society-economy/price-survey-5/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_8041" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8041" style="width: 900px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260901.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260901.jpg" alt="" width="900" height="883" class="size-full wp-image-8041" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260901.jpg 900w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260901-300x294.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/01-20260901-768x753.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 900px) 100vw, 900px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8041" class="wp-caption-text">The biscuit on the upper left is "Sunflower Seed Snack," and the one with a cow drawing is "Milk Candy." These snacks are also produced and sold domestically using raw materials imported from China, according to reports. Photographed in North Korea's northern region in June 2026 (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>In North Korea, products manufactured in factories are generally referred to as "industrial products." The Kim Jong-un regime, perceiving a crisis as the domestic market is being eroded by Chinese products, has strongly appealed for the promotion of domestic production. Taking the coronavirus pandemic as an opportunity, the regime has strictly regulated the import of finished products from China while simultaneously pushing strongly for a transition toward a structure that pursues domestic production using imported raw materials. In this fifth installment, we report on the prices of domestically produced industrial products. Reporting partners in Ryanggang Province and North Hamgyong Province investigated the state-run store selling prices for 15 product categories including clothing and shoes in May and June. (<em>HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won</em>)</p>
<h2>◆Clothing and Shoes …15 Product Categories Investigated</h2>
<p>State-run stores are, in principle, specialized in selling domestically produced goods, and sell consumer goods such as clothing, shoes, candy, alcohol, and beer. Chinese products are known to be sold in foreign exchange stores.</p>
<p>The table below shows the prices for clothing and shoes sold at a state-run store in Ryanggang Province in June 2026. There is a possibility that prices have risen since July.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8040" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8040" style="width: 900px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/hyou-20260904.jpeg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/hyou-20260904.jpeg" alt="" width="900" height="410" class="size-full wp-image-8040" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/hyou-20260904.jpeg 900w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/hyou-20260904-300x137.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/hyou-20260904-768x350.jpeg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 900px) 100vw, 900px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8040" class="wp-caption-text">Prices at state-run stores, surveyed in June 2026. (ASIAPRESS survey)</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆The Perception That "Domestic Products" = Semi-Chinese Products</h2>
<p>The following is a summary of what was conveyed in May and June by six reporting partners residing in four cities in Ryanggang Province and North Hamgyong Province.</p>
<p>According to domestic reporting partners, the general perception is that even though it is called<strong> "domestic product,"</strong> it is essentially semi-Chinese product. This is because most goods produced in state-run factories import not only raw materials but also packaging materials from China.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8042" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8042" style="width: 772px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-20260901.jpeg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-20260901.jpeg" alt="" width="772" height="454" class=" wp-image-8042" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-20260901.jpeg 666w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/02-20260901-300x177.jpeg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 772px) 100vw, 772px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8042" class="wp-caption-text">"Conference to Implement Plenary Session Decisions" held in Pyongyang in January 2023. A "Domestic Production" slogan (yellow circle) is displayed. Cited from the Korean Central News Agency.</figcaption></figure>
<p>A woman who defected by boat from South Hamgyong Province in October 2023 and entered South Korea testified to ASIAPRESS: <strong>"I believed the government's continued propaganda that domestic production was progressing, but when trade with China stopped due to COVID, food prices skyrocketed all at once. When I realized the reality was that they were Chinese products, I was disappointed, thinking 'Can't our country even make candy?'"</strong></p>
<p>Meanwhile, among reporting partners in North Hamgyong Province, there was also a perception that in the case of inexpensive socks or running shirts,<strong> "they are purely domestic products using domestically produced cotton."</strong> However, since China is a world-leading producer of cotton and cotton textiles while North Korea's production of cotton fiber is only at a minimal level, the possibility that domestically produced cotton is being used appears to be low.</p>
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		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
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		<title type="html"><![CDATA[＜Inside N. Korea＞ Even Heatwave Countermeasures Risk Your Life… Family Buried Alive While Sleeping in a Pit Dug to Escape the Heat — ACs for the Wealthy, a Blatant &quot;Cooling Gap&quot;]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/extreme-heat/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=8036</id>
		<updated>2026-08-31T07:37:36Z</updated>
		<published>2026-08-31T07:37:36Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[Heatwaves come for everyone alike, but not everyone can endure them alike. As record-breaking high temperatures blanket …]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/extreme-heat/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_8037" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8037" style="width: 800px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/01-20260831.jpeg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/01-20260831.jpeg" alt="" width="800" height="450" class="size-full wp-image-8037" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/01-20260831.jpeg 800w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/01-20260831-300x169.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/01-20260831-768x432.jpeg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8037" class="wp-caption-text">(FILE PHOTO) North Korean women doing laundry in the Yalu River in late summer. Since the COVID-19 outbreak, access to riverbanks has been strictly controlled, so this kind of scene can no longer be seen. Photographed from the Chinese side in Sakju County, North Pyongan Province, September 2019 (ISHIMARU Jiro)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Heatwaves come for everyone alike, but not everyone can endure them alike. As record-breaking high temperatures blanket the globe, North Korea too is seeing a continuing string of accidents and damage caused by the heat. The gap between those who can afford cooling equipment (air conditioners) and those who cannot has been thrown into sharp relief by the heatwave, at times becoming a matter of life and death. (<em>Intern reporter HAN Gaon / KANG Jiwon</em>)</p>
<h2>◆ How North Koreans Are Coping with the Extreme Heat</h2>
<p>Record-breaking heat continued in North Korea as well this summer. According to Korean Central Television, from early July to early August this year the highest temperatures reached 33 degrees Celsius in the northern region, 37 degrees Celsius in the eastern region, and 38–39 degrees Celsius in the southern region. In early August, a reporting partner in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, said,<strong> "Many farms say this year's harvest is a complete write-off. Even corn that had grown tall is drying up and dying before it can ripen because of the drought. And it's not just crops. The authorities are telling people not to work more than three hours during the day and to work at night instead, but there have also been deaths from heatstroke."</strong><br />
※ The extent of heatwave damage to crops will be covered in a separate article.</p>
<p>When Seoul's highest temperature reached 39 degrees Celsius this summer, residents of Seoul crowded indoors to escape the heat. But residents of Hyesan headed instead to pits dug about one meter into the ground, shaded storage sheds, or the riverside. Some among the wealthy and privileged cadres own air conditioners and receive priority access to electricity, but ordinary households have, at best, a fan — and even that is hard to use because of power shortages. People have no choice but to find other ways to cope with the heat.</p>
<p>As a countermeasure against the heatwave, North Korean authorities instructed people to avoid outdoor activity from 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. and to work in the morning and at night instead. Beyond that, about all they offered was advice to wear a hat or use a parasol, wear sunglasses, and drink plenty of water.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8038" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8038" style="width: 800px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/02-20260831.jpeg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/02-20260831.jpeg" alt="" width="800" height="489" class="wp-image-8038" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/02-20260831.jpeg 601w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/02-20260831-300x183.jpeg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8038" class="wp-caption-text">(FILE PHOTO) On August 3, 2026, Korean Central Television issued a high-temperature warning in its news broadcast and reported on precautions to take. Screen capture from Korean Central Television</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ A Pit Instead of an Air Conditioner, a Shed Instead of a Fan</h2>
<p>Simply following the government's advice obviously does nothing to help people escape the heat. People try to find alternatives however they can, but this sometimes leads to tragedy. A reporting partner in Hyesan said,<strong> "It's too hot both inside and outside the house, so there's nowhere to sleep. There was a case where an entire family died, buried in soil, while sleeping in a pit dug inside a storage shed."</strong></p>
<p>The reporting partner added,<strong> "The inside of apartments feels like a furnace, so people lay out bedding in front of their apartment buildings to sleep, or go sleep in storage sheds."</strong></p>
<p>A defector who lived in Ryanggang Province until 2019 said,<strong> "In the summer, ordinary people would wrap cloth or cardboard around their storage sheds to block out the sunlight and make a place to sleep there."</strong> Seven years on, it seems that people’s' countermeasures against the heat have barely changed.</p>
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			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
					</author>

		<title type="html"><![CDATA[North Korea&#039;s Economy Seen Through a Large-Scale Price Survey (4): Food and Foodstuffs… Enormous Price Surges Continue　1–2 kg of White Rice Equals a Month&#039;s Wages]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/price-survey-4/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=8027</id>
		<updated>2026-09-08T07:55:22Z</updated>
		<published>2026-08-28T03:39:44Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" /><category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="North Korea&#039;s Economy Seen Through a Large-Scale Price Survey" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[&#160; ASIAPRESS conducted a large-scale price survey in four locations across northern North Korea in May and June of t…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/price-survey-4/"><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>
<figure id="attachment_8028" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8028" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/029_farms.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="663" class="size-full wp-image-8028" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/029_farms.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/029_farms-300x199.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/029_farms-768x509.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8028" class="wp-caption-text">Farm workers harvesting corn. Late September 2023, photographed from the Chinese side, Sakju County, North Pyongan Province (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>ASIAPRESS conducted a large-scale price survey in four locations across northern North Korea in May and June of this year. This is an attempt to assess the current state of the North Korean economy through concrete data. Starting with the fourth installment of this series, we present the price data while also explaining how the numbers should be interpreted and the systems behind them. This installment looks at food and foodstuff prices.<em> (HONG Mari / KANG Jiwon)</em></p>
<h2>◆1 kg of White Rice Costs 40,000 Won, Equal to a Month's Wages</h2>
<p>Before getting into the details, it should be noted that food prices have continued to rise even after July, once the large-scale survey was completed. Corn, the North's other staple food, in particular has surged since August to nearly double its May price, hitting a record high. We will report separately on the causes once we have finished analyzing them.</p>
<p>As reported in a previous article, food is sold twice a month at state-run grain outlets called "ryanggok panmaeso" (grain sales stations). The main items are white rice, corn, and wheat/wheat flour. From early May to early June, we received price reports three times from grain sales stations in Ryanggang Province and North Hamgyong Province.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8030" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8030" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/02_糧穀販売所価格表_E.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="486" class="wp-image-8030 size-full" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/02_糧穀販売所価格表_E.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/02_糧穀販売所価格表_E-300x146.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/02_糧穀販売所価格表_E-768x373.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8030" class="wp-caption-text">Food prices at grain sales stations, May–June 2026. (ASIAPRESS survey)</figcaption></figure>
<p>The blank cells in the table indicate items that could not be surveyed due to circumstances on the reporting partner's end. Wheat and wheat flour prices are missing for North Hamgyong Province, though sales of these items were in fact taking place. According to the reporting partner, the grain sales stations sell not only domestic grain but also grain from China and Russia, and Russian wheat and wheat flour in particular have been circulating in large quantities since around February of this year.</p>
<p>The difference in white rice and corn prices in Ryanggang Province in early May was due to differences in grade. Grain is classified into high, medium, and low grades, but residents reportedly cannot choose which origin or grade to buy. This is because stock arrives unpredictably — sometimes only high-grade domestic goods come in, other times only low-grade Chinese goods — leaving residents with little to no choice.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8029" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8029" style="width: 900px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260826-02.jpeg" alt="" width="900" height="675" class="wp-image-8029 size-full" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260826-02.jpeg 900w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260826-02-300x225.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260826-02-768x576.jpeg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 900px) 100vw, 900px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8029" class="wp-caption-text">ASIAPRESS held a seminar in Seoul, South Korea on June 24, 2026, to release the results of the large-scale price survey. About 150 people attended, including researchers, journalists, and members of the public. (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>In Ryanggang and North Hamgyong Provinces, the cost of transporting grain from breadbasket regions such as Hwanghae Province also affects prices. As a result, even though these are state-run monopoly outlets, prices vary by region.</p>
<p>The wages of an average worker at a North Korean state-owned enterprise are generally around 35,000–50,000 won a month (approximately 0.56–0.8 South Korean won as of June 12). That is barely enough to buy 1–2 kilograms of white rice.</p>
<h2>◆White Rice Price Up 6.8-Fold, Corn 2.5-Fold in 3.5 Years</h2>
<p>An essential point about food prices is that enormous inflation is underway. The graph below shows the price trends of white rice and corn from early January 2023 to mid-June 2026. The price surge is immediately apparent.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8032" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8032" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/04_23-26年白米とトウモロコシ価格推移_E.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="632" class="wp-image-8032 size-full" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/04_23-26年白米とトウモロコシ価格推移_E.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/04_23-26年白米とトウモロコシ価格推移_E-300x190.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/04_23-26年白米とトウモロコシ価格推移_E-768x485.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8032" class="wp-caption-text">Trends in food prices in private transactions, January 2023 to June 2026. White rice rose as much as 6.8-fold. (ASIAPRESS survey)</figcaption></figure>
<p>As of early January 2023, white rice cost 5,600 won and corn cost 3,400 won (both per kilogram). By mid-June 2026, white rice had reached 38,500 won and corn 8,500 won — increases of 588% for white rice and 150% for corn. Corn continued to climb after that, reaching 15,600 won as of August 21, for a total increase of a staggering 359%.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8033" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8033" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/06_26年5-8月白米とトウモロコシ価格推移_E.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="567" class="size-full wp-image-8033" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/06_26年5-8月白米とトウモロコシ価格推移_E.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/06_26年5-8月白米とトウモロコシ価格推移_E-300x170.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/06_26年5-8月白米とトウモロコシ価格推移_E-768x435.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8033" class="wp-caption-text">Trends in food prices in private transactions, May to August 2026. Corn prices spiked starting in August, doubling within three months. (ASIAPRESS survey)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Naturally, this surge in food prices hits everyday life directly. Wages at state-owned enterprises were raised more than tenfold nationwide all at once around the end of 2023, but have remained frozen ever since. Take, for example, a monthly wage of 50,000 won: in January 2024, that would have bought 8.8 kilograms of white rice or about 16.1 kilograms of corn, but by June 2026 it buys only 1.3 kilograms of white rice or 5.9 kilograms of corn. By August, it buys only 3.2 kilograms of corn.</p>
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			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
					</author>

		<title type="html"><![CDATA[North Korea&#039;s Economy Through a Large-Scale Price Survey (3): The State Monopoly on Food Distribution Deepens — What Is the Current State of Grain Sales Stations?]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/price-survey-3/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=8022</id>
		<updated>2026-09-04T02:37:39Z</updated>
		<published>2026-08-27T05:53:14Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" /><category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="North Korea&#039;s Economy Seen Through a Large-Scale Price Survey" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[Around January 2023 the North Korean government banned the sale of rice, corn, and other food items in markets and unifi…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/price-survey-3/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_8023" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8023" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260825-01.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260825-01.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="549" class="size-full wp-image-8023" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260825-01.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260825-01-300x165.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260825-01-768x422.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8023" class="wp-caption-text">1. A grain sales station in operation. The sign reads "Yeonpung Grain Sales Branch," and inside, people can be seen purchasing food. Iron doors and bars have been installed as a precaution against thieves. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border across from Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, September 2025 (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Around January 2023 the North Korean government banned the sale of rice, corn, and other food items in markets and unified food sales under the state-run food monopoly stores known as "grain sales stations." It also strictly restricted individuals, businesses, and institutions from trading food without authorization from the authorities. Let's take a look at the current state of the Kim Jong-un regime's forcibly implemented food distribution monopoly policy. (<em>ISHIMARU Jiro</em>)</p>
<h2>◆ The Forcibly Implemented State Food Monopoly System</h2>
<p>Beginning around 2019, the Kim Jong-un regime began trial operations of grain sales stations in some regions. This marked the start of a policy shift away from market-centered food distribution toward a state monopoly system. The prices of white rice and corn, the staple foods, were set slightly lower than market prices. However, deliveries were irregular, and sales would end once the stock sold out. Quality was also lower than in the markets — in some cases stones were even mixed in with the grain.</p>
<p>From 2021, the system shifted to fixed-quantity sales once a month. According to a survey conducted in North Pyongan, Ryanggang, and North Hamgyong provinces in December of that year, prices at grain sales stations were nearly identical across all regions under a "unified pricing system," set at about two-thirds of market prices, with each household able to purchase about a 10-day supply. Separately, workers who reported regularly for duty at factories or enterprises were provided a 3-to-5-day supply of corn for their own portion.</p>
<p>Around January 2023, the sale of food in markets was banned. People’s food purchases were restricted to grain sales stations, but sales volumes remained unstable and failed to meet the amount needed. This was because the state had not yet secured enough food to achieve a full monopoly on distribution. It was unable to completely stop the covert circulation of food held by farms, farm workers, and enterprises.</p>
<p>Entering 2025, sales volumes at grain sales stations gradually stabilized. As long as one had money, it generally became possible to purchase the amount needed for daily life. However, in the northern provinces of Ryanggang and North Hamgyong, deliveries of white rice remained extremely scarce, and sales continued to center on corn. This is reportedly due to strengthened restrictions on transporting white rice out of Hwanghae Province, the country's rice-growing region. The problem is the marked rise in prices. "Food is being sold, but we don't have the money to buy it" is the most pressing issue for the majority of ordinary citizens.</p>
<p>※ Food prices will be reported on in detail in the next installment.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8024" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8024" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260825-02.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260825-02.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="623" class="size-full wp-image-8024" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260825-02.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260825-02-300x187.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260825-02-768x478.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8024" class="wp-caption-text">2. Farm workers use oxen to plow a corn field after the harvest. In North Korea's rural areas, where farm machinery and fuel are scarce, oxen remain an important source of labor. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border across from Sakju County, North Pyongan Province, September 2025 (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ Where Does the Food Come From?</h2>
<p>Below is a summary of reports made in May and June by six reporting partners living in four cities in Ryanggang and North Hamgyong provinces.</p>
<p>Grain sales stations sell twice a month, divided into early- and late-month periods, by neighborhood unit (inminban). Overseeing this is the Food Administration Bureau under the People's Committee (local government). Where does this food come from? It can be broadly divided into three categories.</p>
<p>1. Food the state acquires through "mandatory purchase" of farms' planned production quotas.<br />
2. Surplus food held by individuals and farms, purchased by the state.<br />
3. Surplus food held by enterprises (production from subsidiary plots, food imported by trading companies), purchased by the state.<br />
※ Subsidiary plot: farmland used by institutions or enterprises such as military units to produce food supplied to their members.</p>
<p>Private transactions of 15 kilograms or more of food held by farmers are also strictly cracked down on, and in principle, when farmers sell food, it is purchased by the grain sales stations.</p>
<p>※ South Korea's Daily NK published an article on August 7 titled "Some Grain Sales Stations Effectively Run on Bribes… 'No Different from Individual Rice Trading.'" Grain sales stations and food distribution are managed extremely strictly by the Food Administration Bureau, leaving no room for donju (the newly wealthy class) to get involved. As will be discussed later, prices too are set by the people's government. I would like to point out that this is likely a factual misunderstanding. If there is any room for donju involvement, it would be limited to profiting during the process of transporting food from farms to the grain sales stations.</p>
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			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
					</author>

		<title type="html"><![CDATA[North Korea&#039;s Economy Seen Through a Large-Scale Price Survey (2): Markets Shrink Under Kim Regime Control — Hardline Policy Aims to Put Distribution Back in State Hands]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/price-survey-2/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=8017</id>
		<updated>2026-08-31T07:24:20Z</updated>
		<published>2026-08-25T08:19:52Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" /><category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="North Korea&#039;s Economy Seen Through a Large-Scale Price Survey" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[Since 2000, many North Koreans have gradually escaped hunger and raised their standard of living, largely because loosen…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/price-survey-2/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_8018" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8018" style="width: 900px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260819-01.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260819-01.jpg" alt="" width="900" height="676" class="size-full wp-image-8018" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260819-01.jpg 900w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260819-01-300x225.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260819-01-768x577.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 900px) 100vw, 900px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8018" class="wp-caption-text">A woman selling fruit. The old days of free trading are gone — merchants must now register their supply source and selling price with the commercial management office. The man in front may be carrying water for daily use. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border in September 2025, Hyesan, Ryanggang Province. (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>Since 2000, many North Koreans have gradually escaped hunger and raised their standard of living, largely because loosened state controls allowed private economic activity, including trading, to flourish. Markets (jangmadang) played the central role in this shift. But with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Kim Jong-un regime moved to forcefully suppress markets and private economic activity, pushing measures to concentrate the distribution of everyday consumer goods in state-run stores. This second installment in the series reports on the current state of markets, which are shrinking as authorities tighten management and control. (<em>Ishimaru Jiro</em>)</p>
<h2>◆Regulations Make It Harder for Merchants to Stock Goods</h2>
<p>Markets were once the hub of food and consumer goods distribution. Merchants were not hired clerks but independent operators running stalls roughly 80 centimeters wide. They paid a stall fee (market tax) to the market management office and set their own prices, calculating a profit margin on goods they purchased at their own risk and expense.</p>
<p>Consumer goods flowing in from China dominated the markets. Trading companies imported the goods and sold them wholesale nationwide for enormous profits, and merchants were free to buy stock as they pleased.</p>
<p>When the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020 and imports of Chinese goods stopped, merchants took a heavy hit. On top of this, the Kim Jong-un regime poured effort into rebuilding state-run stores and pursued policies aimed at having the state reclaim the distribution leadership that markets had held. As a result, the markets' slump became structural, and they have continued to shrink.</p>
<p>Even after the COVID-19 crisis subsided and North Korea–China trade recovered, authorities kept restrictions on imports of Chinese consumer goods in place. Domestically produced goods, too, are no longer allowed to be sold wholesale directly to markets by the factories that make them. Domestic products made at factories are now required to be supplied to state-run stores first. Market merchants have been left with no choice but to receive their wholesale supply from state-run stores, which also set the prices. The room for free purchasing has shrunk dramatically.</p>
<p>In addition, as discussed further below, the sale of rice, corn, and other food grains in markets was banned starting around January 2023, with sales shifted to the state-run food monopoly outlets known as "grain sales offices" (ryanggok panmaeso).</p>
<figure id="attachment_8019" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8019" style="width: 743px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260819-02.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260819-02.jpg" alt="" width="743" height="557" class=" wp-image-8019" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260819-02.jpg 640w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260819-02-300x225.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 743px) 100vw, 743px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8019" class="wp-caption-text">A market scene from the past: a food stall at Moran Market in central Pyongyang. The women working there were not clerks but operators of their own 80-centimeter-wide stalls. Photographed July 2011 by Koo Kwang-ho (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆Merchants Now Source Their Stock Mainly From State-Run Stores</h2>
<p>Let's look at the current state of market operations in concrete terms. The following is compiled from reports sent in through mid-June by six reporting partners living in four cities across Ryanggang Province and North Hamgyong Province.</p>
<p><strong>"Individuals can't handle wholesale or retail sales of products from state-run factories or imports. The only exception is when an official from a related agency, enterprise, or trading company has reported through which channel the goods will be sold. This is meant to prevent individuals from freely lowering prices in ways that would disrupt the state distribution network."</strong></p>
<p><strong>"In the markets, the range of items that can be sold has been sharply narrowed, and merchants can only sell goods that have been registered with the market management office under the commercial management office, listing the place of production. Product registration is tracked using barcodes."</strong></p>
<p>In other words, goods whose place of production and supply source are unclear can no longer be handled in the markets.</p>
<p><strong>"Merchants pay the market management office a market tax, an electronic payment fee, and other maintenance charges. Customer payments are increasingly made via QR-code transfer rather than cash. The old practice of individuals handing cash directly to market management staff to pay their fees has disappeared."</strong></p>
<p>The Kim Jong-un regime is aggressively pushing a shift to a "cashless" system, and electronic payment became mandatory at state-run stores starting this past March. This trend is spreading rapidly into the markets as well. However, because power supply conditions in provincial cities remain poor, payment terminals often can't be used due to blackouts, and transactions frequently have to revert to cash, according to reports.</p>
<p>For reference, the market tax at the Hyesan market in Ryanggang Province was roughly 1,200 won a day as of early June, with slight variation depending on the type of goods sold. For sales outlets that manufacturing enterprises operate directly inside the market, the rate was 1,500 to 2,000 won a day. (1,000 won is worth roughly 22 South Korean won.)</p>
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			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
					</author>

		<title type="html"><![CDATA[North Korea&#039;s Economy Seen Through a Large-Scale Price Survey (1): Data Over Impressions! Unraveling the Structure of State-Run Stores]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/price-survey-1/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=8010</id>
		<updated>2026-08-31T07:24:11Z</updated>
		<published>2026-08-19T02:12:05Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" /><category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="North Korea&#039;s Economy Seen Through a Large-Scale Price Survey" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[Accurately diagnosing the economy of North Korea, a self-isolated state, is difficult, since there are extremely few yar…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/price-survey-1/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_8012" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8012" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260818-01a.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260818-01a.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="705" class="size-full wp-image-8012" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260818-01a.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260818-01a-300x212.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260818-01a-768x541.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8012" class="wp-caption-text">Whole roasted chickens being sold. It may look like free enterprise, but all sales are currently conducted under the management of commercial management offices. Individual commercial activity is subject to thorough control. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border in September 2025, showing Hyesan, Ryanggang Province.</figcaption></figure>
<p>Accurately diagnosing the economy of North Korea, a self-isolated state, is difficult, since there are extremely few yardsticks (indicators) and little information available for assessment. Recently, analyses claiming that "North Korea's economy is improving" have appeared frequently from experts and media outlets. However, the data or indicators offered as evidence are thin. A large-scale price survey was conducted in the northern region of North Korea in May and June as an attempt to present data and use it to analyze the current state of North Korea's economy. (<em>ISHIMIARU Jiro</em>)</p>
<h2>◆ A Reality of Overwhelmingly Insufficient Indicators</h2>
<p>As is well known, the economic statistics released by the North Korean regime—including the government budget—are almost nonexistent. Trade statistics between North Korea and China published by the Chinese government are among the few relatively reliable indicators available. Beyond that, the only materials available for assessment are satellite image analysis, photos and videos taken by an extremely limited number of visitors such as Russians in central Pyongyang, articles released by North Korean state media, and estimates from the Bank of Korea. It would be helpful to make contact with business figures who travel between North Korea and China, but that is very difficult (since entry restrictions on Chinese business figures were eased in May, this may become more feasible going forward).</p>
<p>This journalist has long been dissatisfied with vague assessments claiming that "North Korea's economy has improved (or worsened)." Unless such claims show, through some indicator, "what specifically improved (or worsened), compared to when, and in what way," they do not go much beyond the realm of impressionistic argument.</p>
<p>It is also important to show "for whom" things have improved (or worsened). For example, if North Korea–China trade has become more active, and North Korea has gained the financial breathing room to invest in the munitions industry or in construction projects in Pyongyang as compensation for supporting Russia's war of invasion in Ukraine, then from the perspective of the Kim Jong-un regime, one could say "the economy has improved."</p>
<p>But that does not necessarily mean that industry in provincial cities or the livelihoods of ordinary residents have improved. Without presenting separate information or data as indicators, it is difficult to judge whether things have improved or worsened.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8014" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8014" style="width: 650px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260818-02.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260818-02.jpg" alt="" width="650" height="488" class="size-full wp-image-8014" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260818-02.jpg 650w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260818-02-300x225.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 650px) 100vw, 650px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8014" class="wp-caption-text">(Reference photo) At the officially sanctioned markets, which have expanded repeatedly over the years, Chinese-made goods dominated the market, from food to clothing, footwear, daily necessities, and electronics, and merchants were full of energy. Photographed in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, in August 2013.</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ A Large-Scale Price Survey Conducted in the Northern Region</h2>
<p>From May through mid-June this year, a large-scale price survey was conducted in the northern region of North Korea. It covered more than 45 categories, ranging from consumer goods to public utility fees such as electricity and medical costs, to wages (pay) at state-run enterprises. Though it has its limits, this is an attempt to present, in data form, indicators for judging the current state of North Korea's economy.</p>
<p>An overview of the survey is as follows.</p>
<p>・Survey period: May 2026–mid-June 2026・Survey areas: Four locations in North Hamgyong Province and Ryanggang Province</p>
<p>・Survey method: Research and interviews by reporting partners inside North Korea<br />
※Contact was made via Chinese smartphones smuggled into North Korea</p>
<p>・Survey items: Grain (rice, corn, wheat, wheat flour), food products (cooking oil, soy sauce, soybean paste, soybeans, tofu, pork, etc.), public utility fees (electricity, water, coal for heating, public transportation fares, medical costs), industrial goods (clothing, footwear, etc.), wages (state-run enterprises, local factories), unit prices for consignment processing work, etc.</p>
<p>・Limitations of the survey: Reliable information could not be obtained for Pyongyang or other regions. The survey was limited to the consumption behavior of ordinary citizens; it was not possible to survey the wealthy class.</p>
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			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
					</author>

		<title type="html"><![CDATA[＜Obituary＞ Hiroshima-born North Korean defector Park Young-suk passes away — 35 years in North... Brothers and sons taken away and killed — Family suffered from after-effects of the atomic bombing]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/huhou/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=8005</id>
		<updated>2026-08-31T07:23:50Z</updated>
		<published>2026-08-10T08:14:40Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[Park Young-suk, a North Korean defector originally from Hiroshima, passed away in Seoul on August 3. Park went to North …]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/huhou/"><![CDATA[<p><center><iframe loading="lazy" width="800" height="450" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/wx6pZeH6JGI?si=nD9FeR6CSZXFoazN" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></center></p>
<p>Park Young-suk, a North Korean defector originally from Hiroshima, passed away in Seoul on August 3. Park went to North Korea in December 1962 as part of the "repatriation project" for ethnic Koreans in Japan. Two of her brothers and two of her sons were taken away for political reasons and died. In 1997 she defected with her daughter and grandson and entered South Korea. She spoke publicly about the harsh experiences she endured in North Korea and about the atomic bomb damage her family suffered in Hiroshima. She was 85.(<em>ISHIMIARU Jiro</em>)</p>
<figure id="attachment_8006" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8006" style="width: 900px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-001.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-001.jpg" alt="" width="900" height="645" class="size-full wp-image-8006" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-001.jpg 900w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-001-300x215.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-001-768x550.jpg 768w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-001-90x65.jpg 90w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 900px) 100vw, 900px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8006" class="wp-caption-text">&nbsp;Park Young-suk, photographed a month and a half before her death, in Seoul, June 2026 (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ Returned to be at her father's deathbed, but arrived too late</h2>
<p>Born to parents who had come to Japan from South Gyeongsang Province, Park was born in Hiroshima in December 1940, the eighth of ten siblings. While evacuated to Azaka in Yamagata County, Hiroshima Prefecture, she witnessed the mushroom cloud of the atomic bomb. Her family's home in Hirose Kitamachi was destroyed, and her eldest brother's wife, who was pregnant at the time, was killed in the blast. Her fourth-oldest brother, who later went to North Korea, suffered for many years from the after-effects of radiation exposure.</p>
<p>In 1960, her parents and seven siblings repatriated to North Korea, but Park herself, wary of the lack of freedom under socialism, refused to go. In her youth in Hiroshima, she enjoyed classical music, theater, and film.</p>
<p>Park went to North Korea at the age of 22. After receiving a letter saying her father was gravely ill, she rushed to North Korea alone in December 1962, hoping to be at her parents' side at the end, but by the time she arrived in Chongjin her father had already died 19 days earlier. The brother who came to meet her in Chongjin reportedly scolded her, saying, "Why did you come? I wrote in the letter telling you not to."</p>
<figure id="attachment_8007" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8007" style="width: 900px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-002.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-002.jpg" alt="" width="900" height="608" class="size-full wp-image-8007" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-002.jpg 900w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-002-300x203.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-002-768x519.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 900px) 100vw, 900px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8007" class="wp-caption-text">A photo taken with the family of her older sister who remained in Japan, before Park went to North Korea. Park, then 21, is on the far right. Provided by the family.</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ Two brothers and two sons taken away and killed, one after another</h2>
<p>She was assigned to live with her family in Sinuiju, in North Pyongan Province, at the northwestern edge of North Korea. She married a man who had also repatriated from Kanagawa Prefecture, and had two sons and a daughter.</p>
<p>Tragedy struck in the 1970s. Her second-oldest brother was taken away by the Ministry of State Security (secret police) and died; the charges against him were never disclosed. Her third-oldest brother, who voiced discontent over this, was also taken away and died in prison. Then, in the 1980s her eldest son, and in the 1990s her second son, were taken away and died. She said the bodies of her brothers and sons were never returned to the family, even for burial. Despairing of any future in North Korea, in 1997 she crossed the Yalu River into China and successfully made her way to South Korea.</p>
<figure id="attachment_8008" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8008" style="width: 900px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-003.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-003.jpg" alt="" width="900" height="607" class="size-full wp-image-8008" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-003.jpg 900w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-003-300x202.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260807-003-768x518.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 900px) 100vw, 900px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8008" class="wp-caption-text">&nbsp;A photo taken with her grandson in North Korea, believed to date from around 1995–97, shortly before she defected. Provided by the family.</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ A rare moment when the gentle Park showed emotion</h2>
<p>Park always smiled, and her manner and bearing were extremely gentle. This writer conducted four long interviews with her starting in 2018, and even when speaking of the painful experience of losing four family members — taken away and killed — she never openly showed sadness or anger. She spoke slowly and calmly, as though taking the facts out one by one from a box of memories.</p>
<p>In late June, I visited her home in Seoul with a copy of Testimony: North Korean Repatriates (Shueisha), which included her story. Delighted that the book was finished, Park began reading her own profile page. When she reached the line<strong> "Two brothers and two sons were taken away and died,"</strong> she broke down in tears and said, for the first time showing emotion, <strong>"We hadn't done anything wrong..."</strong></p>
<h2>◆ A life buffeted by history and politics</h2>
<p>Looking back over my interview notes on the late Park's story, I find myself thinking once again of the many injustices that befell this family of ethnic Koreans from Japan. The atomic bomb damage the family suffered in Hiroshima, and the siblings' earnest hope of receiving the higher education in North Korea that had been largely out of reach for them in Japan, led to their repatriation. The family was then scattered across Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. And on top of that came the political killings the family suffered in North Korea.</p>
<p>Park herself bore countless burdens that were entirely beyond her control — a life buffeted by politics and by the times. May she rest in peace.</p>
<p>■<a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2025/08/society-economy/hibakusya/"><strong>＜Atomic Bomb Survivors Who Went to N. Korea＞"My Brother Suffered for Life": Testimony of N. Korean Defector Park Young-sook</strong></a></p>
<p>■<a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2018/08/recommendations/zainichi-korean-returnees/"><strong>What happened to the 93,000 Zainichi Koreans who returned to North Korea?</strong></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
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		<title type="html"><![CDATA[＜Inside N.Korea＞ Power Outages Disrupt Electronic Payments... The Cost of Neglecting Local Power Infrastructure: The Gap With Major Cities]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/electronic-payment/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=8001</id>
		<updated>2026-08-28T03:41:41Z</updated>
		<published>2026-08-05T08:41:04Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[The Kim Jong-un regime has been strongly pushing a "cashless" policy since the start of this year. As part of this drive…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/08/society-economy/electronic-payment/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_8002" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8002" style="width: 600px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260801-00010000-asiap-000-1-view.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260801-00010000-asiap-000-1-view.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="450" class="size-full wp-image-8002" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260801-00010000-asiap-000-1-view.jpg 600w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260801-00010000-asiap-000-1-view-300x225.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8002" class="wp-caption-text">The "Narae" electronic payment card issued by the Foreign Trade Bank of Korea. First issued for foreigners in 2010, it can now also be used by North Korean citizens. Photo provided by a Chinese traveler.</figcaption></figure>
<p>The Kim Jong-un regime has been strongly pushing a "cashless" policy since the start of this year. As part of this drive, electronic payment equipment has been introduced at state-run stores and elsewhere, but in provincial cities, frequent power outages mean payment cards often cannot be used properly, according to a reporting partner in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province, in late July. (HONG Mari / KANG Jiwon)</p>
<h2>◆ Heat and Humidity Short-Circuit Payment Terminals</h2>
<p>In an article this past March, ASIAPRESS reported that North Korean authorities had, starting in March, banned the use of cash in principle for state-run commercial facilities and transactions between enterprises, forcibly pushing a shift to electronic payment. The policy called for nationwide adoption "all the way down to the military and rural areas," but five months later, what does reality look like?</p>
<p>The reporting partner recently reported on the state of electronic payments in Hoeryong as follows:</p>
<p><strong>"On July 23, the electronic payment terminal in Osandeok-dong broke down after short-circuiting, and it seems payment by Narae Card won't be possible there for the time being. At first, the authorities suspected arson, and the National Intelligence Agency (the secret police, formerly the Ministry of State Security) and the Ministry of Social Security investigated, but it seems the cause was the heat and high humidity.</strong></p>
<p><strong>They ran an electric fan to cool the machine down, but in a small city like this, there aren't many card users, and since the equipment isn't properly maintained, problems like this happen often, I think."</strong></p>
<p>※ Narae Card: A card first issued by the Foreign Trade Bank of Korea in 2010</p>
<figure id="attachment_8003" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-8003" style="width: 800px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260801-00010000-asiap-001-1-view.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260801-00010000-asiap-001-1-view.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="533" class="size-full wp-image-8003" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260801-00010000-asiap-001-1-view.jpg 800w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260801-00010000-asiap-001-1-view-300x200.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260801-00010000-asiap-001-1-view-768x512.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-8003" class="wp-caption-text">Hoeryong, seen across the Tumen River, the border river with China. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border in August 2012. (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ "In the Cities, Code-Based Payments Are Advancing, But..."</h2>
<p>Behind all this lies the power shortage. Multiple ASIAPRESS reporting partners reported in a June survey that in the northern region, electricity still comes on for only about two to three hours a day.</p>
<p>As for the electricity needed to run electronic payment systems, the Kim Jong-un regime has demanded that<strong> "commercial facilities solve the problem themselves."</strong> But the only measures available have been things like diverting power that was previously supplied first to state-run factories over to state-run stores during peak usage hours, or having facilities install solar panels.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, regarding the situation in major cities, the reporting partner said,<strong> "In Chongjin, Kimchaek, Kilju, and Hamhung, hardly anyone carries cash anymore — if you don't use a card, people treat you like you're behind the times. Code-based payment is developing there too, and the gap with provincial areas seems to keep growing."</strong></p>
<p>Hoeryong is one of the more populous cities along the Tumen River, which forms the border between North Korea and China. The fact that even Hoeryong is in this state — despite the authorities' policy of eliminating cash use and shifting to electronic payment — is itself evidence that the Kim Jong-un regime has continued to put off investment in local power infrastructure. Other mid-sized cities are presumed to be in a similar situation.</p>
<p>※ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.</p>
<figure id="attachment_7770" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7770" style="width: 600px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/northkorea_map.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/northkorea_map.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="627" class="wp-image-7770" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/northkorea_map.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/northkorea_map-287x300.jpg 287w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/northkorea_map-980x1024.jpg 980w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/northkorea_map-768x803.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7770" class="wp-caption-text">Map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>■<a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/03/society-economy/cashless/"><strong>＜Inside N. Korea＞ Order to Prohibit Cash Use in in State-Owned Commercial Facilities and Enterprise Transactions… Cashless Push Intensifies; North Korean Won Continues to Fall</strong></a></p>
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			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
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		<title type="html"><![CDATA[＜Inside N. Korea＞ Expanded Powers? Secret Police Renamed &quot;National Information Bureau&quot; — Three Changes Confirmed Inside the Country]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/politics/henka/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=7992</id>
		<updated>2026-08-28T03:41:37Z</updated>
		<published>2026-05-31T06:39:55Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Politics" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[North Korea's secret police agency, the Ministry of State Security, has reportedly been renamed the State Information Bu…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/politics/henka/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_7993" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7993" style="width: 500px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/01-20260530.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/01-20260530.jpg" alt="" width="500" height="594" class="size-full wp-image-7993" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/01-20260530.jpg 500w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/01-20260530-253x300.jpg 253w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 500px) 100vw, 500px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7993" class="wp-caption-text">(File photo) In December 2013, Jang Song-thaek was sentenced to death at a special military tribunal of the Ministry of State Security. Jang, who was Kim Jong-un's uncle, was executed. The Rodong Sinmun published photographs said to have been taken inside the courtroom. From the Rodong Sinmun, December 12, 2013.</figcaption></figure>
<p>North Korea's secret police agency, the Ministry of State Security, has reportedly been renamed the State Information Bureau. Name changes for security agencies are not uncommon in North Korea, but is this one purely cosmetic? Have its powers and functions changed as well? A reporting partner in Musan County, North Hamgyong Province, shared details of three changes observed in mid-April. (<em>HONG Mari / KANG Jiwon</em>)</p>
<h2>◆ Kim Jong-un: "Establish a subdivided, specialized police system"</h2>
<p>According to the Korean Central News Agency, on March 23 of this year Kim Jong-un addressed the Supreme People's Assembly (the country's parliament) and stated that "with a view to maintaining public order on a higher level, it is natural and beneficial to establish the (police) system subdividing the field of legal struggle and making it professional," adding that "its establishment will be favourable for fully ensuring mutual ties and collaboration by clearly defining the work demarcation among the law-enforcement organs at home and realizing cooperation with foreign police organizations."</p>
<p>South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), in a closed-door briefing for lawmakers at the National Assembly Intelligence Committee on April 6, reportedly explained that "the Ministry of State Security has been reorganized into the State Information Bureau, the Ministry of Social Security has been incorporated into the Cabinet, and the introduction of a police system has also been announced," according to South Korean media reports.</p>
<p>While Kim Jong-un's remarks cited above contain no direct reference to the "National Information Bureau," the reorganization of the Ministry of State Security may well be part of the broader initiative to "establish a police system." South Korean media also conveyed the NIS's analysis suggesting this may reflect an intent to move toward becoming a more normalized state.</p>
<p>So have there actually been changes on the ground within the secret police apparatus? A reporting partner in Musan County relayed recently observed developments, including information received from a personal acquaintance who is an information guidance officer.</p>
<figure id="attachment_7994" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7994" style="width: 649px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/02-20260530.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/02-20260530.jpg" alt="" width="649" height="547" class="size-full wp-image-7994" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/02-20260530.jpg 649w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/02-20260530-300x253.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 649px) 100vw, 649px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7994" class="wp-caption-text">The central area of Musan County, home to North Korea's largest iron ore mine. The mountain in the background is the mine site. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border in October 2016. (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ Staff increases, new independent detention facility established</h2>
<p><strong>— What changes have been observed in Musan County since the reorganization into an inf ormation bureau?</strong></p>
<p>"The title 'security guidance officer' [bowi jidowon] has been changed to 'information guidance officer' [jeongbo jidowon]. Also, while each enterprise previously had one assigned security officer, there are now three enterprises that have had two information guidance officers assigned to them."</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>— What other developments have there been?</strong></p>
<p>"A new detention facility for the information bureau is being built. Until now, the Musan County security department had no detention facility of its own and shared the one belonging to the Safety Agency [Ministry of Social Security / police]. After April 15 [Kim Il-sung's birthday], construction is to begin on a new facility to house all detainees currently held in the Safety Agency's detention center and bring them under the information bureau's management. An escort section [responsible for transferring suspects and detainees] has also reportedly been newly established, to ensure completely separate management from the Safety Agency."</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In North Korea, security guidance officers have long been assigned to enterprises, schools, and residential areas to monitor and control residents. The reporting partner noted that information guidance officers now have narrower jurisdictions than before — meaning, in effect, that more officers are being deployed to each location.</p>
<p>The establishment of a separate detention facility — previously shared with the Ministry of Social Security police — along with a new escort section, suggests a clear intent to separate the bureau's mandate and authority from those of ordinary police organs.</p>
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			</entry>
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			<name>asiapress</name>
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		<title type="html"><![CDATA[＜Inside N. Korea＞ City Residents Fleeing to the Mountains — Slash-and-Burn Farming as a Last Resort Amid Falling Incomes and Soaring Prices]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/society-economy/falling-incomes/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=7987</id>
		<updated>2026-08-10T08:17:17Z</updated>
		<published>2026-05-29T08:37:57Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[A growing number of residents are heading into the mountains to survive through slash-and-burn subsistence farming as a …]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/society-economy/falling-incomes/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_7988" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7988" style="width: 800px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260529.jpeg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260529.jpeg" alt="" width="800" height="449" class="size-full wp-image-7988" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260529.jpeg 800w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260529-300x168.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260529-768x431.jpeg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7988" class="wp-caption-text">(File photo) Elderly residents climbing a mountain path to tend fields in the hills. Photographed in the mountains of the northern region, June 2013. (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>A growing number of residents are heading into the mountains to survive through slash-and-burn subsistence farming as a "last resort." Among those making this choice are men in their forties who should be in their prime working years, as well as divorced women and even Korean Workers' Party members. What is driving people into the mountains? The answer lies in sharply reduced cash incomes and runaway inflation. A reporting partner in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, filed this report in mid-May. (HONG Mari / KANG Jiwon)</p>
<h2>◆ White Rice Up 233%, Corn Up 163% in One Year</h2>
<p>"Slash-and-burn farmers" (hwajeonmin) are people who leave their homes and go deep into the mountains, clearing land by burning vegetation to grow crops and sustain themselves. This practice has existed on the Korean Peninsula for centuries. In North Korea, it appeared on a large scale during the catastrophic famine of the mid-1990s known as the "Arduous March."</p>
<p>Carrying whatever food they have on hand, these people retreat into the mountains and hole up in makeshift plastic sheeting shelters or temporary dugouts that barely keep out the wind and rain, living entirely off what they can grow or forage. There is no electricity, no running water — a primitive existence cut off from the city. The reporting partner reports that the number of people making this choice has been rising steadily.</p>
<p><strong>"Because it's hard to make ends meet and there's no trade to be done, people go into the mountains to dig up wild vegetables or farm a patch of land,"</strong> the reporting partner said.<br />
But why has it come to this?</p>
<p>Seizing on the COVID-19 pandemic as a pretext, the Kim Jong-un regime imposed severe restrictions on private economic activity, including trade. Cash incomes for urban residents plummeted. On top of that, prices surged dramatically compared to a year earlier — white rice by 233% and corn by 163%, according to ASIAPRESS research. Since wages at state-owned enterprises are fixed, purchasing power has collapsed.</p>
<p>So who exactly is heading into the mountains?</p>
<p><strong>"There are a lot of elderly people, but also widowers, and women who are divorced and supporting their parents. The men tend to be in their forties and older — the kind of age where their hair is going gray. They've probably just given up on life in the city because prices have gone up and there's no way forward. I've heard there are even Party members among them."</strong></p>
<figure id="attachment_7989" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7989" style="width: 900px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-20260529.jpeg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-20260529.jpeg" alt="" width="900" height="557" class="size-full wp-image-7989" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-20260529.jpeg 900w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-20260529-300x186.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-20260529-768x475.jpeg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 900px) 100vw, 900px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7989" class="wp-caption-text">(File photo) Cultivated fields visible on a steep hillside — sotoji (private plots farmed illegally by individuals). Poorer hwajeonmin go deeper into the mountains in an attempt at self-sufficiency. Photographed from the Chinese side looking toward Manpo, Jagang Province, October 2024. (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ Factories Idle, Working-Age People Heading for the Hills</h2>
<p>At the same time, the Kim Jong-un regime has tightened its grip on food distribution, placing it under state control. Sales of food in the jangmadang (public markets) have been banned, leaving residents with no way to obtain staple foods other than through the small rations they receive from their state employer and purchases from the state-run food stores known as ryanggok pamsaso.</p>
<p>But reports indicate that an increasing number of enterprises are falling behind on wages and rations — or failing to pay them at all.</p>
<p><strong>"Some enterprises are partially operating, but most aren't making ends meet. Everything is struggling except foreign trade and subcontracting work, and looking around, there's no one who isn't doing subcontracting."</strong></p>
<p>Even where factories want to operate, severe cash shortages make it impossible. As a result, many people are earning income through piecework done at home — known locally as imgagong (subcontracting) — producing wigs, false eyelashes, and similar items from raw materials brought in from China. The finished products are exported to China and have become an important source of foreign currency earnings for North Korea.<br />
In short, the system as designed — where workers receive rations from their workplace and buy any shortfall from the ryanggok pamsaso using their wages — has broken down entirely. The state does provide small amounts of food free of charge through local neighborhood offices to so-called jeolyangseidae — households that have completely run out of food and money — but only those with no able-bodied workers qualify.</p>
<p>When the reporting partner says that "widowers and women supporting parents after a divorce have gone into the mountains," this reflects the reality that households with only one working-age adult, who must report to a job that provides neither adequate wages nor adequate food rations, are left with no viable way to survive in the city — and so they leave.</p>
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			<name>asiapress</name>
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		<title type="html"><![CDATA[＜Inside N. Korea＞ Chinese Entrepreneurs Rush to Visit N. Korea: &quot;Anyone Can Go If You Send Your Passport Information&quot; — Entry Procedures Simplified to Attract Investment]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/society-economy/rush/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=7984</id>
		<updated>2026-08-31T07:23:57Z</updated>
		<published>2026-05-22T02:28:11Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[North Korean authorities have reportedly relaxed visa invitation requirements significantly for Chinese entrepreneurs vi…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/society-economy/rush/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_7985" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7985" style="width: 938px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01m-026-05-20.jpeg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01m-026-05-20.jpeg" alt="" width="938" height="754" class="size-full wp-image-7985" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01m-026-05-20.jpeg 938w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01m-026-05-20-300x241.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01m-026-05-20-768x617.jpeg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 938px) 100vw, 938px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7985" class="wp-caption-text">Entry and exit records for one Chinese investor visiting North Korea. The investor crossed into North Korea on April 2 and returned on April 4, departing from Quanhe in Hunchun, Jilin Province, near the lower reaches of the Tumen River. The records indicate a two-day stay in Rason, North Hamgyong Province. Photo taken by a Chinese reporting partner.</figcaption></figure>
<p>North Korean authorities have reportedly relaxed visa invitation requirements significantly for Chinese entrepreneurs visiting for trade and investment purposes. Free accommodation, extended stay periods, and other incentives are being offered to encourage visits, and a rush of Chinese business travelers to North Korea has begun. A source in Jilin Province with expertise in China-North Korea trade reported this in late April. (<em>KANG Ji-won</em>)</p>
<h2>◆Stay Period Extended from One Week to One Month</h2>
<p>The Chinese trade source reported on developments at the border crossing between Changbai County in Jilin Province and Hyesan in Ryanggang Province.</p>
<p><strong>"North Korean authorities are issuing invitation letters in bulk to Chinese entrepreneurs considering investment. The process is simple — anyone can enter easily just by submitting basic information such as passport details."</strong></p>
<p>Stay periods have also been extended. Previously, even with a business invitation letter, visitors were limited to short stays of around one week. Since April, however, stays of up to one month have become possible.</p>
<p><strong>"Visitors can now inspect factories, mines, and construction sites directly. Tourism itineraries are also more flexible than before — rather than following a fixed route, visitors can pre-book destinations after arrival, with schedules arranged around their inspection plans to include coastal areas, recreational sites, and the like."</strong></p>
<p>Furthermore, entrepreneurs willing to sign investment contracts are reportedly being offered exceptional terms: preferential customs treatment, complimentary hotel stays, and long-term residency rights. The effect has been immediate, with the rush of visitors beginning as soon as April arrived.</p>
<p><strong>"These days, the area in front of the Changbai customs post is so packed with cars of people heading to North Korea that there's nowhere to park,"</strong> the trade source said, describing the scene.</p>
<figure id="attachment_7986" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7986" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-026-05-20.jpeg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-026-05-20.jpeg" alt="" width="1000" height="750" class="size-full wp-image-7986" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-026-05-20.jpeg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-026-05-20-300x225.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-026-05-20-768x576.jpeg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7986" class="wp-caption-text">A Chinese vehicle entering the North Korean Hyesan customs area from Changbai County, Jilin Province. Photographed in September 2025. (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ Interest Concentrated on "Processing Trade" in Seafood and Similar Goods</h2>
<p>So what products are drawing the interest of Chinese trading companies and investors? Trade with North Korea is severely restricted under UN Security Council sanctions. Imports require approval from Chinese customs authorities, and U.S. secondary sanctions — penalties targeting organizations and companies that do business with North Korea — are another serious deterrent.</p>
<p>On this point, the source said: <strong>"The sector Chinese entrepreneurs are most interested in is seafood. The thinking is that processed seafood — dried or seasoned products — can get around sanctions. Requests are pouring in from parties who want to process the goods inside North Korea and then bring them into China."</strong></p>
<p>Seafood imports from North Korea are banned under UN sanctions, but apparently there is now a possibility that Chinese customs authorities might approve processed products. Chinese businesses also appear to believe that other sanctioned goods, such as minerals, could become importable if they undergo processing inside North Korea.</p>
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			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
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		<title type="html"><![CDATA[＜Inside N. Korea＞ Luxury Hotels Kim Jong-un Built Sit Empty — Chinese Tourists Stay Away from Mount Paektu, Staff Desert Posts Citing &quot;No Money to Be Made&quot;]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/society-economy/kanko/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=7979</id>
		<updated>2026-06-01T06:41:51Z</updated>
		<published>2026-05-19T03:01:47Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[The North Korean government is actively courting Chinese tourists, with Mount Paektu — the volcanic peak straddling the …]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/society-economy/kanko/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_7980" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7980" style="width: 900px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/001-20260517-00010000-asiap-000-1-view.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/001-20260517-00010000-asiap-000-1-view.jpg" alt="" width="900" height="565" class="size-full wp-image-7980" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/001-20260517-00010000-asiap-000-1-view.jpg 900w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/001-20260517-00010000-asiap-000-1-view-300x188.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/001-20260517-00010000-asiap-000-1-view-768x482.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 900px) 100vw, 900px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7980" class="wp-caption-text">Kim Jong-un inspects the newly opened Samjiyon hotels with his daughter. He is reportedly also planning a mountain railway and ski resort. Photo from Korean Central News Agency, December 23, 2025.</figcaption></figure>
<p>The North Korean government is actively courting Chinese tourists, with Mount Paektu — the volcanic peak straddling the North Korea–China border — at the center of its strategy. Samjiyon, in Ryanggang Province, serves as the gateway for summit tours and has been a pet project of Kim Jong-un for a decade. Five luxury hotels were completed there at the end of last year. But are Chinese tourists actually coming? What are the resort's real prospects? ASIAPRESS investigated conditions on the ground. (<em>ISHIMARU Jiro / KANG Jiwon</em>)</p>
<h2>◆ Kim Jong-un Orders an International Resort Built in a Remote Mountain Village</h2>
<p>Samjiyon is a cold, primeval forest town about 47 kilometers from Hyesan, the provincial capital of Ryanggang Province. Beyond potato farming and logging, there is virtually no industry to speak of.</p>
<p>In November 2016, Kim Jong-un ordered the construction of a "world-class international tourism special zone" there. Residents were mobilized en masse to build roads, housing, and hospitals in a crash construction campaign. The town opened in December 2019 and was elevated from county to city status — only for the COVID-19 pandemic to strike a month later, indefinitely delaying the hoped-for influx of Chinese tourists.</p>
<p>Kim Jong-un continued to order improvements nonetheless, and in December 2025, five new resort hotels were completed. State media gave extensive coverage to Kim's visit to the opening ceremony, daughter in tow.</p>
<h2>◆ Staff Who Came Expecting Profits Are Leaving</h2>
<p>A reporting partner living in Ryanggang Province investigated conditions in Samjiyon and reported back in late April.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>— The hotels look impressive in photos. What's the actual situation?</strong></p>
<p>I'm told the hotels were sealed off immediately after Kim Jong-un's on-site inspection last December, because no one visits in winter. After that, hotel specialists were dispatched from Pyongyang to train local staff and take on management roles in preparation for receiving foreign tourists. When they arrived from Pyongyang, they expected Chinese tourists to come flooding in — but guests remain almost nonexistent.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>— So the people who came from Pyongyang have nothing to do?</strong></p>
<p>The accommodations and food are poor, and those with connections have gone back to Pyongyang. Children of well-connected officials also came from Pyongyang and other regions, believing the Party's word that tourists would pour in and that there was money to be made. Workers for a Chinese restaurant came too. But Samjiyon really is deep in the mountains. Some have given up and left because no tourists come at all.</p>
<figure id="attachment_7981" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7981" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260516-00010000-asiap-001-1-view.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260516-00010000-asiap-001-1-view.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="853" class="size-full wp-image-7981" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260516-00010000-asiap-001-1-view.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260516-00010000-asiap-001-1-view-300x256.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260516-00010000-asiap-001-1-view-768x655.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7981" class="wp-caption-text">The summit of Mount Paektu, climbed from the Chinese side. The beauty of Lake Cheonji, the caldera lake at the top, is breathtaking. Photographed by Ishimaru Jiro, September 2019.</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ Fewer Than 20 Tourists</h2>
<p><strong>— How many tourists are actually coming right now?</strong></p>
<p>Other than the families of soldiers or local meritorious workers, I'm told there are fewer than 20 tourists. Higher-ups have said numbers will grow starting in May, when Mount Paektu tourism season begins — but attracting Chinese visitors purely for leisure, rather than business, won't be easy.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>— Enormous investment went into developing Samjiyon. Recouping it seems unlikely — maintenance alone must be costly.</strong></p>
<p>Samjiyon's conditions were poor to begin with. There's really nothing there but potatoes. Supplies have to be trucked in from Hyesan, which means fuel costs and overall expenses high.</p>
<p>The operation and management of the hotels are the responsibility of Samjiyon City and the Tourism Management Bureau, but neither has funds. The state has authorized the Tourism Management Bureau to earn foreign currency independently, so they're reportedly looking for ways to raise money through China. They're openly conducting state-sanctioned smuggling through the Cabinet's Ministry of External Economic Affairs and taking on processing and manufacturing contracts from Chinese firms. There are also three subsidiary companies operating in Hyesan to earn foreign currency.</p>
]]></content>
		
			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
					</author>

		<title type="html"><![CDATA[＜Inside N. Korea＞&quot;Contacting Family in South Korea Is Betrayal&quot;: Public Criticism and Ideological Struggle Sessions Spread; Informants Lead to Exile]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/politics/exile/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=7977</id>
		<updated>2026-06-01T06:41:58Z</updated>
		<published>2026-05-18T09:23:32Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Politics" /><category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[The Kim Jong-un regime is intensifying its crackdown on people with family members who have defected to South Korea, and…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/politics/exile/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_7877" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7877" style="width: 900px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/01a-20260225.jpeg" alt="" width="900" height="563" class="wp-image-7877 size-full" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/01a-20260225.jpeg 900w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/01a-20260225-300x188.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/01a-20260225-768x480.jpeg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 900px) 100vw, 900px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7877" class="wp-caption-text">(File photo) Anyone found to have received remittances from defector family members is reportedly exiled to a remote area or coal mine. Pictured: a man working at a construction site, his face covered in dust, photographed in September 2025. Taken from the Chinese side across from Hyesan, Ryanggang Province. (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>The Kim Jong-un regime is intensifying its crackdown on people with family members who have defected to South Korea, and is handing down severe punishments — including banishment to remote areas or coal mines — when contact with such family members is discovered. Receiving remittances from South Korea is now characterized as "behavior that corrodes the socialist spirit," and ordinary residents are being encouraged to inform on their neighbors, leading to a growing number of denunciations. A reporting partner in North Hamgyong Province filed this report in late April.<em> (HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)</em></p>
<h2>◆ Family Receiving Remittances from Two Daughters Caught and Exiled to Coal Mine</h2>
<p>In late 2023, Kim Jong-un declared that "the Republic of Korea is an enemy — neither the same people nor a partner for reunification." Since then, controls on the flow of information, goods, and money to and from South Korea have been tightened even further. Then in March of this year, the concept of "North-South reunification" was removed entirely from the constitution at a session of the Supreme People's Assembly (the equivalent of a parliament), and punishments for those deemed to have "connections to the South" appear to have intensified around that time.</p>
<p>A reporting partner who works on a farm in a county in North Hamgyong Province relayed the following cases from people around them:</p>
<p><strong>"I heard that a whole family was exiled to a coal mine. They'd been living well — the mother's two daughters had defected to South Korea and were sending money, and the family used it to buy a car and a motorcycle and even ran a food trading business.</strong><br />
<strong>The mother had been dealing in medicine and fuel, and had also been lending money at high interest to fund construction projects. She was reported for 'anti-socialist behavior,' investigated, and sent away as a warning to others. I've heard that exiled people will be arriving at my farm in May as well."</strong></p>
<figure id="attachment_7978" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7978" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="944" class="size-full wp-image-7978" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-300x283.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-768x725.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7978" class="wp-caption-text">Kim Jong-un delivering a policy address at the March session of the Supreme People's Assembly. Korean Central News Agency, March 24, 2026</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ Those Who Prospered on Remittances Now Cast Out as Exiles</h2>
<p>The number of people defecting to South Korea peaked between 2006 and 2011, exceeding 2,000 per year. After settling in South Korea, many began sending money back to family still in North Korea through illegal underground banking networks linking China and North Korea. Recipients found themselves receiving amounts of foreign currency unimaginable by North Korean standards, and their changed circumstances made them objects of envy among ordinary residents.</p>
<p>That has now changed completely. Those with defector family members have become subject to strict surveillance, and anyone found to have received remittances from South Korea is reportedly subjected to harsh public criticism before being banished to a remote area or coal mine.</p>
]]></content>
		
			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
					</author>

		<title type="html"><![CDATA[＜Inside N. Korea＞ Bicycle Repair Brought Under State Control as Crackdown on Private Economic Activity Intensifies]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/society-economy/bicycle/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=7973</id>
		<updated>2026-06-01T06:42:23Z</updated>
		<published>2026-05-14T06:38:38Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[The Kim Jong-un regime's campaign against private economic activity appears to be tightening further. According to a rep…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/society-economy/bicycle/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_7974" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7974" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-2026-05-13.jpeg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-2026-05-13.jpeg" alt="" width="1000" height="649" class="size-full wp-image-7974" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-2026-05-13.jpeg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-2026-05-13-300x195.jpeg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-2026-05-13-768x498.jpeg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7974" class="wp-caption-text">(File photo) As bicycles rapidly proliferated, independent bicycle repairers became a ubiquitous presence. Photographed in Gangdong, Pyongyang, 2008, by Jang Jeong-gil. (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>The Kim Jong-un regime's campaign against private economic activity appears to be tightening further. According to a reporting partner in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, who filed a report in mid-April, authorities have been conducting home searches and confiscating parts from roadside bicycle repair operators. (<em>HONG Mari / KANG Jiwon</em>)</p>
<h2>◆ Home Searches and Parts Confiscations</h2>
<p>Since the COVID pandemic, the Kim Jong-un regime has imposed strict controls on private economic activity, including trade. Merchants who once operated freely have been brought under the authority of the Sangŏp Kwalliso (Commercial Management Office — a department of the People's Committee that oversees the distribution of consumer goods), and are now required to register both their suppliers and their selling prices.</p>
<p>A reporting partner recently described a new wave of enforcement measures:</p>
<p><strong>"You know how they've been cracking down on private trade? The authorities tried to go after people who were undercutting the Commercial Management Office on bicycle repairs, but it wasn't working. So now they've started labeling the independent repairers as handlers of stolen goods, and people in the repair business are being hauled in. Someone nearby had their home searched and their bicycle parts confiscated."</strong></p>
<p>Bicycle use surged in North Korea during the mass economic collapse of the mid-1990s. With workplaces failing to provide either food rations or wages, people threw themselves into private trade en masse. Demand for bicycles — essential for both travel and hauling goods — spiked sharply, and large quantities of used bicycles were imported from Japan. The rapid spread of bicycles gave rise to a thriving repair trade:<br />
tire patching and parts replacement became a fixture of daily commerce, and independent bicycle repairers became a common sight throughout the country.</p>
<p>In late January, a reporting partner informed ASIAPRESS that authorities had begun cracking down on home-based garment tailoring operations. The current targeting of bicycle repairers appears to be part of the same broader pattern: the Kim Jong-un regime bringing informal private economic activity that had previously slipped through the cracks under formal state control.</p>
]]></content>
		
			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>asiapress</name>
					</author>

		<title type="html"><![CDATA[＜Inside N. Korea＞ Mother and Daughter Die After Eating Wild Greens — People Collapsing in the Streets: Inflation Deepens the &quot;Spring Lean Season,&quot; Widening Hunger Among the Vulnerable]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/society-economy/starvation-2/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=7970</id>
		<updated>2026-06-01T06:42:17Z</updated>
		<published>2026-05-12T09:50:55Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[As North Korea's spring hunger season — known as the boritgoge, or "barley hump" — gets underway, growing numbers of peo…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/society-economy/starvation-2/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_7972" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7972" style="width: 739px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-20260512-00010000-asiap-000-1-view.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-20260512-00010000-asiap-000-1-view.jpg" alt="" width="739" height="533" class=" wp-image-7972" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-20260512-00010000-asiap-000-1-view.jpg 517w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-20260512-00010000-asiap-000-1-view-300x216.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/02-20260512-00010000-asiap-000-1-view-90x65.jpg 90w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 739px) 100vw, 739px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7972" class="wp-caption-text">North Koreans gleaning grain from a harvested field, shoulder bags slung over them for collecting what they find. A family, perhaps — the man in the center appears to still be a student. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border across from Sakju County, North Pyongan Province, September 2025. (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<p>As North Korea's spring hunger season — known as the boritgoge, or "barley hump" — gets underway, growing numbers of people, particularly among the most vulnerable, are going without food. In Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, a mother and daughter died after eating wild greens they had gathered to fill their stomachs. In a rural area of North Hamgyong Province, people were found collapsed in the street from malnutrition, causing a local commotion. Authorities, for their part, appear to be leaving most of the response to enterprises and farms. Reporting partners in both regions filed these reports through mid-April. (<em>HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won</em>)</p>
<h2>◆ Poisoned by Wild Greens Eaten Out of Desperation — The Hardest Season Begins</h2>
<p>In North Korea, the number of households going hungry increases every year starting in late March. Food harvested the previous autumn has been consumed, supply shrinks, prices rise, and even farmers have eaten through their own reserves. This period of spring scarcity, called the boritgoge, leaves countless people struggling with hunger until the potato and barley harvest around June and the corn harvest in August and September.</p>
<p>Reporting Partner A, based in Hyesan, described a heartbreaking incident that occurred in late March:</p>
<p><strong>"On March 23rd, a mother and daughter died. They had bought wild greens at the market late at night, when the price drops, to make a meal of greens and grain in the morning. They got stomach pains and went to the hospital, but died there. In Hyegang-dong, an elderly person also bought and ate wild greens being sold at the market and died from vomiting and diarrhea."</strong></p>
<p>In both cases, it appears that poisonous plants had been mixed in with the wild greens. Reporting Partner A continued:</p>
<p><strong>"Poor people have nothing to eat except boiled corn flour and wild greens. Wild greens are cheap — 1,000 won per kilogram — so everyone is filling up on those."</strong></p>
<figure id="attachment_7971" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7971" style="width: 1000px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><a href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260512-00010000-asiap-000-1-view.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260512-00010000-asiap-000-1-view.jpg" alt="" width="1000" height="620" class="size-full wp-image-7971" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260512-00010000-asiap-000-1-view.jpg 1000w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260512-00010000-asiap-000-1-view-300x186.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/01-20260512-00010000-asiap-000-1-view-768x476.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px" /></a><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7971" class="wp-caption-text">Farm workers loading harvested crops onto an ox cart. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border across from Manpo, Jagang Province, October 2024. (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ Inflation of 100–150% Since the Start of the Year</h2>
<p>North Korea has been experiencing severe inflation. According to price surveys conducted by ASIAPRESS, as of May 1st, one kilogram of white rice costs 34,000 won (0.44 USD), and one kilogram of corn costs 9,000 won (0.12 USD). Compared to the beginning of the year, white rice has risen by 106% and corn by 150%. Meanwhile, the monthly wages of ordinary workers amount to only around 35,000–50,000 won (0.46-0.65 USD), making it clear why cheap wild greens have become a lifeline.</p>
<p>※ 10,000 North Korean won ＝ 0.13USD<br />
Authorities have reportedly begun inspecting wild greens before they go on sale to prevent toxic varieties from circulating. But as Reporting Partner A put it:<strong> "The number of people selling them on the sly to avoid inspections is increasing, and even wild greens are getting more expensive and harder to buy. The crackdown itself makes sense given that people are dying, but it's not helping anyone."</strong></p>
]]></content>
		
			</entry>
		<entry>
		<author>
			<name>洪麻里</name>
					</author>

		<title type="html"><![CDATA[＜Inside N. Korea＞ &quot;Donate to the Fund!&quot; Certificates Issued as Cover for Illegal Economic Activity — The State Siphons Money from Private Citizens]]></title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/society-economy/donation/" />

		<id>https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/?p=7964</id>
		<updated>2026-06-01T06:42:12Z</updated>
		<published>2026-05-07T01:17:48Z</published>
		<category scheme="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang" term="Society / Economy" />
		<summary type="html"><![CDATA[Donations to state "funds" are being actively encouraged in North Korea. The Kim Jong-un regime imposed tight controls o…]]></summary>

					<content type="html" xml:base="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2026/05/society-economy/donation/"><![CDATA[<figure id="attachment_7966" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7966" style="width: 800px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/069.jpg" alt="" width="800" height="510" class="size-full wp-image-7966" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/069.jpg 800w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/069-300x191.jpg 300w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/069-768x490.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7966" class="wp-caption-text">Support activities — through which enterprises and inminban units are compelled to contribute food and other goods to military units chronically short on supplies — are carried out on a frequent basis. Photographed from the Chinese side of the border across from Sinuiju, July 2021（ASIAPRESS）</figcaption></figure>
<p>Donations to state "funds" are being actively encouraged in North Korea. The Kim Jong-un regime imposed tight controls on private economic activity in the wake of the COVID pandemic. Recently, however, reports indicate that the regime is now openly praising donju (the newly wealthy class) for donating large sums — earned through illegal economic activity — to the state. Moreover, donors reportedly receive a certificate that effectively serves as a pardon for their illicit conduct. What lies behind this apparent contradiction? Reporting partners in Musan County, North Hamgyong Province, and Hyesan, Ryanggang Province filed these reports in late April. <em>(HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)</em></p>
<h2>◆ The Purpose of Donations: "Cultivating a Culture of Social Virtue Toward Heroes"</h2>
<p>North Korea's state media frequently references the "Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il Fund," alongside other funds such as the "Education Support Fund," the "Public Health Insurance Fund," and the "Coal Miners Support Fund." April 25 marked the Day of the Sun Army (Chosŏn People's Revolutionary Army founding anniversary). According to multiple reporting partners, the occasion has been used as a catalyst to encourage donations to the Korean People's Army through these funds.</p>
<p>Reporting Partner A, based in Musan, relayed the following:</p>
<p><strong>"Party organizations have issued instructions telling party members and workers to voluntarily carry out support activities in order to build a memorial hall in Pyongyang for soldiers who died abroad — meaning those killed in action during the deployment to Russia."</strong></p>
<p>"Support activities" refers to the practice of enterprises and inminban (neighborhood units) providing pork, grain, and other goods to military units or major construction sites. Conducted under the pretext of supplying chronically under-resourced military and construction operations, this form of semi-compulsory contribution has long been a feature of North Korean life.Reporting Partner A also noted the continuation of existing practices: <strong>"Support of goods and food for soldiers and the families of those killed in action is being carried out without fixed deadlines or defined content."</strong> He then described a newer development:</p>
<p><strong>"Some people are now paying in cash through the funds. Those who donate receive a certificate from their party organization."</strong></p>
<p>The certificate reportedly specifies who donated, to which fund, and how much. Regarding the purpose of the system, Reporting Partner A explained:<strong> "What the party is asking for isn't donations to cover a budget shortfall — it's about cultivating a culture of social virtue toward the heroes and soldiers who gave their lives for the country. Party members are being instructed to take the lead in spreading this spirit throughout society."</strong></p>
<figure id="attachment_7965" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-7965" style="width: 600px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/068.jpg" alt="" width="600" height="452" class="wp-image-7965" srcset="https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/068.jpg 450w, https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/068-300x226.jpg 300w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-7965" class="wp-caption-text">A chalkboard at the entrance to a public market in Kangdong County, Pyongyang. Under the heading "Pioneers of the Spirit of Supporting the Military," it praises merchants who contributed the most grain for military rations. Photographed February 2011. Kim Dong-chul (ASIAPRESS)</figcaption></figure>
<h2>◆ In Hyesan, More Than Ten People Donated Between $1,000 and $5,000</h2>
<p>In Hyesan as well, many residents reportedly took part in support activities around the Army founding anniversary. Reporting Partner B, based in Hyesan, added: "I've heard that more than ten people have donated to the funds and received certificates," and provided the following details:</p>
<p><strong>"Most of the donors are donju who work as sales managers for enterprise output. They contribute whenever something comes up for the country. The head of pharmaceutical management at the city hospital, a worker in the robo-materials management department at the steel factory, a staff member in the import-export division of the trade bureau, and the director of an electronics technical services center all donated. There were also a few restaurant managers, drivers from commercial management office transport units, and some ordinary citizens."</strong></p>
<p><strong>"The amounts donated ranged from $1,000 to $5,000 (USD), contributed to funds including the Education Support Fund, the Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il Fund, and the Fatherland Defense Fund, in exchange for certificates. Lately, the atmosphere is one where everyone wants to get their hands on at least one certificate."</strong></p>
<p>※ Robo-materials (로보물자): Goods such as food, liquor, and cigarettes distributed by the state to workers as additional compensation beyond standard rations or wages.<br />
※ The Fatherland Defense Fund could not be confirmed in state media reports.</p>
<p>How could any individual have accumulated such large sums in the first place?</p>
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