The North Korean government is actively courting Chinese tourists, with Mount Paektu — the volcanic peak straddling the North Korea–China border — at the center of its strategy. Samjiyon, in Ryanggang Province, serves as the gateway for summit tours and has been a pet project of Kim Jong-un for a decade. Five luxury hotels were completed there at the end of last year. But are Chinese tourists actually coming? What are the resort's real prospects? ASIAPRESS investigated conditions on the ground. (ISHIMARU Jiro / KANG Jiwon)

◆ Kim Jong-un Orders an International Resort Built in a Remote Mountain Village

Samjiyon is a cold, primeval forest town about 47 kilometers from Hyesan, the provincial capital of Ryanggang Province. Beyond potato farming and logging, there is virtually no industry to speak of.

In November 2016, Kim Jong-un ordered the construction of a "world-class international tourism special zone" there. Residents were mobilized en masse to build roads, housing, and hospitals in a crash construction campaign. The town opened in December 2019 and was elevated from county to city status — only for the COVID-19 pandemic to strike a month later, indefinitely delaying the hoped-for influx of Chinese tourists.

Kim Jong-un continued to order improvements nonetheless, and in December 2025, five new resort hotels were completed. State media gave extensive coverage to Kim's visit to the opening ceremony, daughter in tow.

◆ Staff Who Came Expecting Profits Are Leaving

A reporting partner living in Ryanggang Province investigated conditions in Samjiyon and reported back in late April.

— The hotels look impressive in photos. What's the actual situation?

I'm told the hotels were sealed off immediately after Kim Jong-un's on-site inspection last December, because no one visits in winter. After that, hotel specialists were dispatched from Pyongyang to train local staff and take on management roles in preparation for receiving foreign tourists. When they arrived from Pyongyang, they expected Chinese tourists to come flooding in — but guests remain almost nonexistent.

— So the people who came from Pyongyang have nothing to do?

The accommodations and food are poor, and those with connections have gone back to Pyongyang. Children of well-connected officials also came from Pyongyang and other regions, believing the Party's word that tourists would pour in and that there was money to be made. Workers for a Chinese restaurant came too. But Samjiyon really is deep in the mountains. Some have given up and left because no tourists come at all.

◆ Fewer Than 20 Tourists

— How many tourists are actually coming right now?

Other than the families of soldiers or local meritorious workers, I'm told there are fewer than 20 tourists. Higher-ups have said numbers will grow starting in May, when Mount Paektu tourism season begins — but attracting Chinese visitors purely for leisure, rather than business, won't be easy.

— Enormous investment went into developing Samjiyon. Recouping it seems unlikely — maintenance alone must be costly.

Samjiyon's conditions were poor to begin with. There's really nothing there but potatoes. Supplies have to be trucked in from Hyesan, which means fuel costs and overall expenses high.

The operation and management of the hotels are the responsibility of Samjiyon City and the Tourism Management Bureau, but neither has funds. The state has authorized the Tourism Management Bureau to earn foreign currency independently, so they're reportedly looking for ways to raise money through China. They're openly conducting state-sanctioned smuggling through the Cabinet's Ministry of External Economic Affairs and taking on processing and manufacturing contracts from Chinese firms. There are also three subsidiary companies operating in Hyesan to earn foreign currency.

The Kim Jong-un regime's campaign against private economic activity appears to be tightening further. According to a reporting partner in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, who filed a report in mid-April, authorities have been conducting home searches and confiscating parts from roadside bicycle repair operators. (HONG Mari / KANG Jiwon)

◆ Home Searches and Parts Confiscations

Since the COVID pandemic, the Kim Jong-un regime has imposed strict controls on private economic activity, including trade. Merchants who once operated freely have been brought under the authority of the Sangŏp Kwalliso (Commercial Management Office — a department of the People's Committee that oversees the distribution of consumer goods), and are now required to register both their suppliers and their selling prices.

A reporting partner recently described a new wave of enforcement measures:

"You know how they've been cracking down on private trade? The authorities tried to go after people who were undercutting the Commercial Management Office on bicycle repairs, but it wasn't working. So now they've started labeling the independent repairers as handlers of stolen goods, and people in the repair business are being hauled in. Someone nearby had their home searched and their bicycle parts confiscated."

Bicycle use surged in North Korea during the mass economic collapse of the mid-1990s. With workplaces failing to provide either food rations or wages, people threw themselves into private trade en masse. Demand for bicycles — essential for both travel and hauling goods — spiked sharply, and large quantities of used bicycles were imported from Japan. The rapid spread of bicycles gave rise to a thriving repair trade:
tire patching and parts replacement became a fixture of daily commerce, and independent bicycle repairers became a common sight throughout the country.

In late January, a reporting partner informed ASIAPRESS that authorities had begun cracking down on home-based garment tailoring operations. The current targeting of bicycle repairers appears to be part of the same broader pattern: the Kim Jong-un regime bringing informal private economic activity that had previously slipped through the cracks under formal state control.

As North Korea's spring hunger season — known as the boritgoge, or "barley hump" — gets underway, growing numbers of people, particularly among the most vulnerable, are going without food. In Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, a mother and daughter died after eating wild greens they had gathered to fill their stomachs. In a rural area of North Hamgyong Province, people were found collapsed in the street from malnutrition, causing a local commotion. Authorities, for their part, appear to be leaving most of the response to enterprises and farms. Reporting partners in both regions filed these reports through mid-April. (HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Poisoned by Wild Greens Eaten Out of Desperation — The Hardest Season Begins

In North Korea, the number of households going hungry increases every year starting in late March. Food harvested the previous autumn has been consumed, supply shrinks, prices rise, and even farmers have eaten through their own reserves. This period of spring scarcity, called the boritgoge, leaves countless people struggling with hunger until the potato and barley harvest around June and the corn harvest in August and September.

Reporting Partner A, based in Hyesan, described a heartbreaking incident that occurred in late March:

"On March 23rd, a mother and daughter died. They had bought wild greens at the market late at night, when the price drops, to make a meal of greens and grain in the morning. They got stomach pains and went to the hospital, but died there. In Hyegang-dong, an elderly person also bought and ate wild greens being sold at the market and died from vomiting and diarrhea."

In both cases, it appears that poisonous plants had been mixed in with the wild greens. Reporting Partner A continued:

"Poor people have nothing to eat except boiled corn flour and wild greens. Wild greens are cheap — 1,000 won per kilogram — so everyone is filling up on those."

◆ Inflation of 100–150% Since the Start of the Year

North Korea has been experiencing severe inflation. According to price surveys conducted by ASIAPRESS, as of May 1st, one kilogram of white rice costs 34,000 won (0.44 USD), and one kilogram of corn costs 9,000 won (0.12 USD). Compared to the beginning of the year, white rice has risen by 106% and corn by 150%. Meanwhile, the monthly wages of ordinary workers amount to only around 35,000–50,000 won (0.46-0.65 USD), making it clear why cheap wild greens have become a lifeline.

※ 10,000 North Korean won ＝ 0.13USD
Authorities have reportedly begun inspecting wild greens before they go on sale to prevent toxic varieties from circulating. But as Reporting Partner A put it: "The number of people selling them on the sly to avoid inspections is increasing, and even wild greens are getting more expensive and harder to buy. The crackdown itself makes sense given that people are dying, but it's not helping anyone."

Donations to state "funds" are being actively encouraged in North Korea. The Kim Jong-un regime imposed tight controls on private economic activity in the wake of the COVID pandemic. Recently, however, reports indicate that the regime is now openly praising donju (the newly wealthy class) for donating large sums — earned through illegal economic activity — to the state. Moreover, donors reportedly receive a certificate that effectively serves as a pardon for their illicit conduct. What lies behind this apparent contradiction? Reporting partners in Musan County, North Hamgyong Province, and Hyesan, Ryanggang Province filed these reports in late April. (HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)

◆ The Purpose of Donations: "Cultivating a Culture of Social Virtue Toward Heroes"

North Korea's state media frequently references the "Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il Fund," alongside other funds such as the "Education Support Fund," the "Public Health Insurance Fund," and the "Coal Miners Support Fund." April 25 marked the Day of the Sun Army (Chosŏn People's Revolutionary Army founding anniversary). According to multiple reporting partners, the occasion has been used as a catalyst to encourage donations to the Korean People's Army through these funds.

Reporting Partner A, based in Musan, relayed the following:

"Party organizations have issued instructions telling party members and workers to voluntarily carry out support activities in order to build a memorial hall in Pyongyang for soldiers who died abroad — meaning those killed in action during the deployment to Russia."

"Support activities" refers to the practice of enterprises and inminban (neighborhood units) providing pork, grain, and other goods to military units or major construction sites. Conducted under the pretext of supplying chronically under-resourced military and construction operations, this form of semi-compulsory contribution has long been a feature of North Korean life.Reporting Partner A also noted the continuation of existing practices: "Support of goods and food for soldiers and the families of those killed in action is being carried out without fixed deadlines or defined content." He then described a newer development:

"Some people are now paying in cash through the funds. Those who donate receive a certificate from their party organization."

The certificate reportedly specifies who donated, to which fund, and how much. Regarding the purpose of the system, Reporting Partner A explained: "What the party is asking for isn't donations to cover a budget shortfall — it's about cultivating a culture of social virtue toward the heroes and soldiers who gave their lives for the country. Party members are being instructed to take the lead in spreading this spirit throughout society."

◆ In Hyesan, More Than Ten People Donated Between $1,000 and $5,000

In Hyesan as well, many residents reportedly took part in support activities around the Army founding anniversary. Reporting Partner B, based in Hyesan, added: "I've heard that more than ten people have donated to the funds and received certificates," and provided the following details:

"Most of the donors are donju who work as sales managers for enterprise output. They contribute whenever something comes up for the country. The head of pharmaceutical management at the city hospital, a worker in the robo-materials management department at the steel factory, a staff member in the import-export division of the trade bureau, and the director of an electronics technical services center all donated. There were also a few restaurant managers, drivers from commercial management office transport units, and some ordinary citizens."

"The amounts donated ranged from $1,000 to $5,000 (USD), contributed to funds including the Education Support Fund, the Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il Fund, and the Fatherland Defense Fund, in exchange for certificates. Lately, the atmosphere is one where everyone wants to get their hands on at least one certificate."

※ Robo-materials (로보물자): Goods such as food, liquor, and cigarettes distributed by the state to workers as additional compensation beyond standard rations or wages.
※ The Fatherland Defense Fund could not be confirmed in state media reports.

How could any individual have accumulated such large sums in the first place?

During its border reporting operations, ASIAPRESS frequently captured images of children near the border. This video shows North Korean children mobilized for various types of labor along the Yalu River in Sakju County, North Pyongan Province, during the period from 2023 to 2025.

Boys carrying water jugs can be seen coming down the mountain, while middle school girls carry sacks of grass for feeding rabbits. The children were also mobilized to transport bales of corn stalks, which are used as livestock feed or heating fuel.

Under the pretext of "cultivating a love for labor" North Korean authorities mobilize children for various types of labor.

Even while working near electrified barbed wire fences marked with "High Voltage Warning" signs, the children maintain cheerful expressions.
Further details can be viewed in the video. (ASIAPRESS)

 
＜N.Korea Video＞ Visiting the North Korea-China Border Lockdown (1) A River Once Used for Laundry, Bathing, and Smuggling

＜N.Korea Video＞ Visiting the North Korea-China Border Lockdown (2) North Korean Residents Completely Caged In

In early 2025, North Korea permitted private vehicle ownership. ASIAPRESS, working with reporting partners inside the country, has previously reported on a surge of smuggled vehicles entering from China and signs that taxi and car rental businesses are expanding. According to recent reports from inside North Korea, female drivers have begun appearing on the roads — but are meeting with strong resistance from men. A reporting partner in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, filed this report in late March. (HONG Mari / KANG Jiwon)

＜Inside N. Korea＞ "Vehicle Vandalism" Surges — Resentment Over Wealth Gap Boils Over — "Veterans and People in Their 40s–50s Are the Main Perpetrators"

◆ Women Behind the Wheel — Including Husband-and-Wife Taxi Teams

A reporting partner living in Hyesan describes the recent changes:

"In the old days, if you saw a Chinese woman driving in Rajin (the special economic zone), people would stare in amazement. Now you start to notice it here too, little by little. Even in Hyesan, you occasionally see women driving with dark sunglasses on.

There are also women who take turns driving taxis with their husbands. Of course, not just anyone can drive — getting a license is something for the children of officials or the donju (the new wealthy class). It seems more common for them to drive their own family's or company's car rather than driving professionally. Apparently female drivers are even more visible in Chongjin, Hamhung, and Pyongyang."

But men's reactions to female drivers, the reporting partner says, can be harsh.

"There are men who spit when they see a woman driving. No matter how much the Party talks about a society of gender equality, deeply ingrained male-supremacist attitudes are still very much alive."

◆ License Costs Hit 1,950 USD — A 12.5-Fold Jump in Three Months

The deeply rooted belief that driving is men's work is surely part of it — but that may not be the only reason men are hostile toward female drivers.

In a January article, ASIAPRESS reported that the bribe required to obtain a license, which "used to be settled for 300–500 yuan (approximately 39–65 USD), now requires at least 1,200 yuan (approximately 156 USD) even if you already know how to drive." In just the past three months, that figure has reportedly skyrocketed to 15,000 yuan (approximately 1,950 USD).

"There was a time when the feeling was, 'Maybe someday we'll be able to drive too,'" the reporting partner said. But driving has now become a symbol of wealth, and for the majority of ordinary people, it serves as a sharp reminder of the widening gap between rich and poor. In a society where contempt for women runs deep, frustration appears to be directed at female drivers — with the sentiment being: "I can barely afford rice, let alone a car, and here's a woman driving one."

The number of people seeking driver's licenses has surged, but for now it remains a phenomenon limited to the wealthy.

"There are a lot of people who want to drive, but most can't afford it. Rather than using a private car to make money (by seeking out business), most people are earning wages by working as hired taxi or freight drivers."

A new residential district called Saeppyol Street has appeared in Pyongyang, North Korea's capital. The inauguration ceremony was held on February 16, with Kim Jong-un in attendance. According to the Rodong Sinmun, he delivered the following remarks:

"The name Saeppyol Street is already enshrined in everyone's hearts as a byword for the lives of those combat veterans who were so brave until their final moments, bearing the weight of a lifetime's worth of meaning in answer to the call of their homeland on distant battlefields."

Saeppyol Street is an apartment complex built for the families of soldiers killed in Russia.

The Kim Jong-un regime began deploying troops to Russia — which continues its invasion of Ukraine — around October 2024. The South Korean government estimates that more than 15,000 troops have been dispatched so far, with approximately 2,000 killed. The North Korean government has made no official announcement regarding the scale of the deployment or casualty figures.

◆ Sweeping Propaganda Campaign: "Let Us Become Heroes"

Since the summer of 2025, the Kim Jong-un regime has sustained a large-scale propaganda campaign glorifying combat soldiers — including the fallen — as heroes. Documentary films have been produced and screened repeatedly in workplaces and schools, while returned veterans are being sent to military units and schools to deliver lectures describing how they "fought bravely, risking their lives for the homeland and for Marshal Kim Jong-un."

A reporting partner living in the northern region relayed information in March after meeting with a woman who had attended a lecture event held in Kilju County, North Hamgyong Province. The woman has a child enrolled in a senior middle school (the equivalent of high school).

"Apparently the students at the event were in tears as they listened. Many of the parents present were also crying. As the woman was leaving the venue, she overheard a student say, 'If I sacrifice myself, will my parents be able to go to Pyongyang?' At the same time, she said there were parents among those attending who were saying things like, 'I don't want to make my son a hero. No matter what they offer, I don't want to send him to war. What's the use of becoming a hero after you're dead?'"

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Soldiers Returned from Russia Deployed on Tour to Promote "Military Spirit" and "Heroism" (2) Propaganda Lectures Delivered to High School Students and Parents — "We Fought with Our Lives as Soldiers of the Marshal"

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Soldiers Returned from Russia Deployed on Tour to Promote "Military Spirit" and "Heroism" (1) "They Fought So Bravely Even the Russians Were Envious"

◆ North Korean Soldiers Dying in Misery

These young men were sent not to defend their own country, but to support Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine. Since December 2024, Ukrainian military authorities have released numerous videos and photographs showing North Korean soldiers being pursued by drones on the battlefields of Kursk Oblast, as well as images of the dead. Needless to say, the Kim Jong-un regime has told the North Korean public nothing of the misery in which these soldiers have died.

Kim Yeong-mi, a South Korean journalist specializing in conflict zones, succeeded in conducting in-person interviews with two soldiers taken prisoner by Ukrainian forces — the result of nearly six months of negotiations with Ukrainian military authorities. The interviews were broadcast on MBC in January and attracted significant attention in South Korea.

According to Ukrainian authorities, the prisoners were born in 1999 and 2005. The two soldiers said:

"We didn't know why we were being deployed or what we were supposed to be doing."

"Gunfire and artillery — it never stopped for a single moment. Explosions everywhere, bodies lying around. Someone standing right in front of you is dead the next second. I'd never seen anything like it."

"They were taking direct hits to the head and dying on the spot, without a word."

Since private vehicle ownership was permitted in North Korea in 2025, incidents of vehicle vandalism and assault have surged in the northern regions, prompting discussion at party organizational meetings and emergency enforcement action by police. Crimes including slashed tires, smashed windows, keyed bodywork, and physical attacks have occurred in rapid succession, with veterans and people in their 40s and 50s said to be the primary perpetrators. A reporting partner living in the northern region described the situation in early April as "an outpouring of frustration over economic inequality and the widening wealth gap." (JEON Seong-jun / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Security Forces on Emergency Alert Over Vehicle Vandalism — "Envy of Car Ownership Is the Biggest Factor"

Reporting Partner A, a Workers' Party member living in North Hamgyong Province, reported in early April that crimes against private property have been rampant in the area.

"There's been a surge in property destruction and unprovoked assaults on individuals, and the security forces are on emergency alert. Among the most common incidents are people puncturing tires on private cars, smashing windows, keying the bodywork, and spitting on vehicles. Car owners have been responding by parking near CCTV cameras or installing dashcams."

Reporting Partner A said that envy of car ownership is above all the driving factor.

"Cars are the biggest source of jealousy. How nicely someone furnishes their home isn't that visible, and going out to restaurants isn't either — but driving a car is out there for everyone to see. People who thought they were on the same level as everyone else are suddenly living in a completely different world, and that's what's causing the resentment."

Reporting Partner A went on to emphasize the seriousness of the situation: "People who've made some money — running restaurants and the like — and drive their own cars are the targets. At first I thought it was just personal spite and jealousy, but now it's being raised at party meetings, which tells you how bad it's gotten."

◆ Conduct Officially Labeled "Subversive Behavior" at Party Cell Life Reviews

As the problem grew more serious, it was officially addressed in early April at a saenghwal chonghwa — a party life review session held for party members.

"The agenda item was that 'subversive behaviors appearing across various sectors are acts that undermine the socialist system,' and the cell secretary [the official responsible for the lowest-level party unit] spoke to the issue. The message was that criminal acts targeting specific individuals, enterprise officials, and commercial vehicles must be dealt with severely, and that party members must take the lead in conveying the party's intentions to the public so that these problems don't arise in their communities. They said, 'commercial vehicles,' but in practice, they mean private cars.

The gist of the meeting was: 'Some degenerate individuals are venting their resentment at their own circumstances by physically lashing out at the changes happening around them and committing various crimes — party members must take the lead in conducting ideological education so this doesn't become a social problem.' But after the meeting, people were turning to each other saying, 'Who could possibly stop this?' and 'How are we supposed to educate anyone out of this?' — they were at a loss."

◆ Veterans and People in Their 40s–50s at the Center of the Incidents

A notable question is who is committing these acts and why. Reporting Partner A analyzes the underlying cause as deepening economic disparity and inequality, and shared candid thoughts:

"Most of the people detained by the security forces for similar incidents this time were said to be veterans and people in their 40s and 50s. Ordinary workers have no hope of owning a car, and there's a widespread sense that if you don't become a cadre, you're condemned to live and die that way forever.

You head to work in the morning having barely managed a bowl of corn rice, and then you see someone driving past kicking up dust or strutting around in clean clothes with a bag full of money — the contrast couldn't be starker.

Is this socialism or capitalism? What do we get for working hard? I catch myself thinking that too. Some people struggle no matter how hard they try, while others were born to the right parents, have the right connections, and eat out at restaurants every day. I'm sure plenty of others feel the same way I do."

◆ Authorities Preparing a Compensation System?

When private vehicle ownership was abruptly permitted in early 2025, large quantities of vehicles flooded in from China through state-sanctioned smuggling channels. Cases of the powerful and the wealthy snapping them up and driving them around multiplied rapidly.

With the wealth gap being thrown into stark relief by cars, frustration among local residents is boiling over. Veterans and the working class — groups who were supposed to be among the privileged — are now emerging as a discontented faction, turning aggressive.

As the situation deteriorates, the authorities are working on countermeasures, the reporting partner said.

"In response to these incidents, it's said that a compensation system is being established — through state support and insurance (seemingly vehicle damage insurance) — to cover losses to state and social property. They're not calling it private property; they're calling it social property."

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

April 15 was "Day of the Sun" (Taeyang-jeol), the national holiday commemorating the birthday of the late Kim Il-sung. Long regarded as the nation's greatest holiday, the occasion has traditionally been marked by numerous events and the distribution of special rations to the population — but in recent years, celebrations have been steadily scaled back. What did this year look like? (ISHIMARU Jiro / KANG Ji-won)

＜Inside N. Korea＞ The Giant Resort Complex Kim Jong-un Built Has Almost Zero Foreign Tourists... Domestic Travel Packages Go on Sale in Bid to Recoup Operating Costs

◆ More References to Jong-un Than to Il-sung

On the evening of the 15th, a female reporting partner living in northern North Korea reported: "The Day of the Sun events consisted of nothing more than a flower-laying ceremony at the Kim Il-sung statue, organized by the Women's League, followed by a thirty-minute commemorative lecture. There was nothing else."

According to multiple reporting partners, until around 2023 it had been customary for events — including sports competitions, loyalty song gatherings, and study sessions on the greatness of Kim Il-sung — to be held over the course of several days. In recent years, however, the scale has been reduced annually.

"The lecture was titled 'The Great Persons of Paektu Who Serve the People Generation After Generation,' and was about the Kim family. There was actually more content about the current Marshal [Kim Jong-un] than about Kim Il-sung. There was no mention whatsoever of his daughter."

It has been a month and a half since the United States and Israel attacked Iran. The two countries have still not reached an agreement in negotiations to end the fighting. How are North Koreans understanding the current situation in Iran and the Middle East? In early April, ASIAPRESS spoke again with a Korean Workers' Party member and reporting partner living in North Hamgyong Province. (HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Even Party Officials Only Aware That "There Was Some Kind of Conflict in the Middle East"

In early March, ASIAPRESS asked three reporting partners living in northern North Korea about domestic reactions to Israel and the United States' surprise attack on Iran and the killing of its supreme leader. All three responded with shock, saying they had no knowledge of it whatsoever.

Reporting Partner A, who was asked to look into the matter again, is a Korean Workers' Party member living in North Hamgyong Province. "I've been hearing a lot about the situation in Iran through ASIAPRESS, but even if I suspected there might be a related meeting or rumor going around, I couldn't ask directly," they said, and reported the results of their careful investigation as follows:

"Nothing about Iran is known here. Nobody around me seems to know anything. I have an acquaintance on the city party committee, and when I heard there had been an international situation briefing for officials, I asked them how things stood abroad lately. They only knew that there had been some kind of conflict in the Middle East and that the global economy wasn't doing well."

◆ On the Killing of the Supreme Leader... "America Is Something Else"

Reporting Partner A then reflected again on the shock of Khamenei's killing:

"The fact that they can take out the president [meaning supreme leader] of another country if they set their mind to it — America is something else. I've heard Iran is a poor country, so I don't know what kind of security he had, but it's truly astonishing.

Maybe that's why they're promoting every day that we have nuclear weapons and that we're a nuclear power. At the spring conscription ceremonies this year, apparently the phrase kyŏlsa ongho — 'defend to the death' — has been coming up a lot. I'm not sure, but they say Kim Jong-un is quite close with President Trump, so surely he won't be assassinated?"

The phrase kyŏlsa ongho refers to defending Kim Jong-un, the Workers' Party's core leadership, or the "Paektu bloodline" — the Kim family dynasty — with one's life.

※ Chomo: The spring military conscription drive. Upon graduating from senior middle school (equivalent to high school), students are subject to enlistment unless they have health issues or are continuing their education.

◆ Lukashenko's Visit Spun as Proof That "The Anti-Imperialist, Anti-American Alliance Has Been Solidified"

North Korea's state media coverage of the Iran situation has been limited to a Foreign Ministry statement in early March condemning the U.S. and Israeli military strikes and a report on the selection of a new supreme leader in Iran, with no mention whatsoever of the assassination. However, the regime appears to be making full use of the situation as an opportunity to promote the solidarity of the pro-Russia camp, both domestically and internationally.

State media gave prominent coverage to Belarusian President Lukashenko's visit to Pyongyang in late March, during which he held talks with Kim Jong-un and signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Belarus is a Russian ally that has also cooperated in the invasion of Ukraine.

During Lukashenko's visit, the message conveyed at a party members' meeting that Reporting Partner A attended emphasized the following:

"Party members were told in a lecture that the anti-imperialist, anti-American alliance had been solidified. Beyond that, the content covered how imperialists are disrupting the international order, how important nuclear armament is, and that a single-minded socialist society united behind the party and the leader [Kim Jong-un] is the secret to certain victory."

It has come to light that North Korean authorities have recently been requiring factories to halt operations during certain hours and redirect electricity to state-run commercial facilities, in order to ensure smooth electronic payments at those outlets. Authorities have also approved the construction of small power generators at individual state-run commercial facilities, leading to a growing number of solar, micro-hydro, and wind power installations. The Kim Jong-un regime is aggressively pushing to make society cashless, and this appears to be a desperate workaround to prevent power outages from disabling electronic payment systems. Since late February, ASIAPRESS spoke in detail with reporting partners living in the northern regions of the country about conditions on the ground. (JEON Song-jun / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Priority Power Supply to the Commercial Network

— We've heard that electricity supply to state-run commercial facilities has recently been made mandatory.

"Electricity that used to be supplied preferentially to state-run factories has recently been redirected to the commercial network. In particular, the provincial people's committee [local government] has issued instructions requiring that electricity be supplied without fail during the after-work hours, when residents are most likely to visit state-run shops — so shops and service outlets are now getting fairly reliable power."

— Why is the state going to such lengths to supply electricity to commercial facilities?

"Because card payments only work when there's electricity. The state has been telling people not to use cash, and instructions came down through the people's committee telling the commercial network itself to take the lead in solving payment system problems caused by power shortages."

— Has the electricity supply actually improved?

"It amounts to a 'cross-supply' arrangement. They cut power to a state factory and redirect it to the commercial network, then after a while shift it to a different enterprise — rotating the limited supply on a timetable. That's about as far as it goes for now."

◆ Commercial Facilities Also Told to Generate Power Through Self-Reliance

— How are commercial facilities supposed to secure electricity on their own?

"The authorities have approved the construction of solar, small-scale hydro, and wind power generators to address the commercial network's power problems. Trading companies are apparently partnering with donju [newly wealthy entrepreneurs] who have capital to import equipment and bringing in solar generators and the like."

— What has the local reaction been?

"Lately, enterprises have been pushed to fend for themselves, and they're com peting with each other to run their commercial outlets and direct-sales shops as well as possible. The state is treating commercial facilities as a priority for installation approvals, on the grounds that they're places where large numbers of people gather and that they serve the public."

North Korea's spring military recruitment drive — known as chomo — has begun. This year, a noticeably higher number of young people are expressing a desire to join special forces units, saying they want to "become true heroes." Authorities have been actively running "hero-making" propaganda campaigns, including sending soldiers who returned from Russia to lecture at their former schools. This appears to be having a significant impact on young people who are still around 18 years old. A reporting partner living in the northern region filed this report in late March. (HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)

◆ "I'll Let My Parents Live in Pyongyang" — Parents Alarmed by Indoctrination

In North Korea, students become eligible for military service upon graduating from senior middle school (equivalent to high school). Males in particular are almost universally conscripted, except in cases of physical disability or university enrollment. According to reporting partners, four rounds of chomo are planned this year.

Every year, cases of young people avoiding or delaying enlistment have been a persistent social problem. But this year the situation has changed dramatically, according to Reporting Partner A:

"Apparently a lot of students want to join the special forces. They're saying things like 'I'm going to become a true hero' and 'if you become a hero, your family will be taken care of.' At one middle school, there was even an event where the children of cadres took the lead in submitting petitions to enlist in frontline units or special operations forces. Parents are extremely worried — these kids don't even understand what it means to die."

State media gave prominent coverage to Kim Jong-un mourning soldiers killed in Russia, and to bereaved families being moved into newly built apartments in Pyongyang for the families of the fallen. As ASIAPRESS reported in late March, authorities have also been sending soldiers who served in Russia to schools across the country to conduct "hero-making" education sessions. Reporting Partner B in the northern region said: "A soldier spoke with tears in his eyes, expressing gratitude for the care shown by the Party and Marshal (Kim Jong-un), and the students were listening in tears as well."

As a result of this indoctrination, some young people who have just graduated from high school have come to believe — and actually hope — that "if I die in combat and become a hero, my family can live well in Pyongyang."

◆ Parents Sending Sons Off with 333 Yuan, Praying for Their Safety

Naturally, parents are deeply worried. Reporting Partner A describes the mood:

"Rumors have spread — people don't know where they heard it — that many soldiers were killed (in the Russia deployment), and parents' anxiety has only grown. The mother of one volunteer said her only son had become completely caught up in playing the hero and told her, 'I'll make sure you get to live in Pyongyang, Mom.' She lamented: 'If my son is gone, I won't be going to Pyongyang — I'll be going to heaven.' Some parents do tell their children to be loyal to the country and become heroes, but that's just what they say out loud."

A particular behavior has reportedly emerged among these parents:

"Parents are sending their children off to enlist with 333 Chinese yuan. In North Korea, the number three is considered lucky — associated with health, safety, and good fortune — so out of sheer desperation they're grasping at superstition. Of course, even that is only possible for families who can afford it."

By the mid-2010s, border fencing was largely complete — yet people could still venture out to the riverbanks beyond the wire for daily life. When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, however, border security became extreme.

North Korean authorities first issued a decree that anyone approaching the border would be shot on sight, cutting residents off entirely from the border zone. Despite chronic power shortages, electric fencing and surveillance cameras were installed. At "No. 10 guard posts" set up near the border, residents and vehicles are subjected to thorough inspections. On the Chinese side, reinforced razor wire and the latest surveillance cameras have added another layer of control.

Reporting partners inside the country are unanimous: defection is now impossible. (ASIAPRESS)

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Footage Copyright: ASIAPRESS The video footage may not be used in any form (copying, selling, renting, distributing, screening, broadcasting, webcasting and debunking) without the prior written consent.

The Yalu River, which runs along the North Korea-China border, was once a vital water source for North Koreans. People regularly came to its banks to do laundry, bathe, and enjoy the water.

But as social upheaval swept through the country in the 1990s, the river became a primary route for defections and smuggling, prompting both governments to tighten border controls. Around 2012, China began erecting wire fencing along its bank — and North Korea soon followed suit.

Today, barbed wire covers most of the 1,400-kilometer border between the two countries. (ASIAPRESS)

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Footage Copyright: ASIAPRESS The video footage may not be used in any form (copying, selling, renting, distributing, screening, broadcasting, webcasting and debunking) without the prior written consent.

The use of soldiers returned from deployment in Russia as propaganda tools has begun spreading into schools. The soldiers are being sent on lecture tours targeting students and parents, with the apparent goal of glorifying soldiers who fight for the state and its leadership. Reporting Partner B met with a mother who had attended one such lecture. (JIRO Ishimaru Jiro / KANG Jiwon)

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Soldiers Returned from Russia Deployed on Tour to Promote "Military Spirit" and "Heroism" (1) "They Fought So Bravely Even the Russians Were Envious"

◆ Alma Mater Designated as "School of Heroes"

Reporting Partner B, based in the northern part of the country, met with a mother in Kilju County, North Hamgyong Province, whose son attends a senior middle school (the equivalent of high school). The mother described a recent lecture by returned soldiers that she had attended.

— Where was the event held, and how many soldiers came?

According to the mother, two soldiers first visited their own alma mater in Kilju County and gave a lecture to students there. A "Heroes' Board" — a display introducing the heroes — was installed at the school, which was officially designated as the alma mater of heroes. After that, an event was held at the county seat hall in Kilju, to which parents were also invited. Senior middle school students and their parents from across the county attended.

◆ Soldiers Speak in Tears, Expressing Gratitude for "the Marshal's Care"

— What was the content of the event?

The event lasted about an hour. The two soldiers spoke in tears, expressing gratitude for the care shown by the Party and Marshal (Kim Jong-un). They said they were moved to have been invited to Pyongyang and praised as heroes, when all they had done was carry out their orders as soldiers.

Following the soldiers' remarks, three students and two parents delivered pledges and personal reflections. These had been prepared in advance and were read aloud. The event closed with the entire audience chanting slogans: "Give our lives to defend the Party Central" and "Let us become bombs."

※ "Party Central" refers to Kim Jong-un and the Korean Workers' Party leadership.

— Was there any mention of why the soldiers were sent to Russia, or of casualties?

The mother said there was nothing of that kind. The soldiers spoke only of being deployed to the operational zone on orders and fighting well, as befits soldiers of the Marshal.

The Kim Jong-un regime is using soldiers who were deployed to Russia — which continues its war against Ukraine — and have since returned home, sending them on tours of military units and schools across the country to promote hero narratives and pro-military education. Vivid footage filmed in Russia is also being used. Based on information conveyed in mid-March by multiple reporting partners living in northern regions of North Korea, this story is being published in two parts. Part 1 covers how combat veterans are being sent to military units to instill fighting spirit. (JIRO Ishimaru / KANG Ji-won)

'Russian deployment heroes’ stained with youth's blood (1) Creating a ‘new hero’ myth through propaganda

◆ Combat Veterans Tour Units Giving Lectures

Reporting Partner A, who lives in a northern region, met a platoon leader stationed at a nearby military unit in mid-March and heard the following account. The non-commissioned officer spoke proudly of a visiting combat veteran who had come to give a lecture.

—— How many combat veterans came to the unit?

According to the platoon leader, one officer and between two and five soldiers who actually fought in Russia have recently been touring units across the country, giving talks about their combat experience there. He also said that since late last year, his unit has been receiving films documenting combat operations and military activities in Russia.

—— What did the combat soldiers talk about in their lectures?

Regarding their battlefield experience, they said: "Our soldiers have the fighting spirit and backbone of true soldiers — they fought so bravely that even the Russians were envious. They emphasized the spirit of 'dying for the gun and bomb' and 'throwing your body into battle.'"

They also stressed that soldiers "must properly understand and learn from modern warfare." According to the platoon leader, the way military training is conducted has changed significantly since the start of winter training exercises.

※ The North Korean military conducts regular winter training exercises each year from December through March.

◆ Watching Footage Filmed on Location in Russia

—— What kind of footage was distributed to the unit?

The footage apparently resembled a movie — full of tension and dramatic scenes — and soldiers reportedly watched it with great emotion. It was likely well-produced for propaganda purposes. The reporting partner asked to see it, but was told that was impossible since the footage is restricted to internal military use and tightly controlled to prevent it from leaking to the public. Copies cannot be made, and viewing is permitted only within military units. The platoon leader added that soldiers were required to write a reflection after watching.

In North Korea, all adults — with the exception of housewives, the elderly, and those with illness — are in principle required to report to whichever workplace the authorities have assigned them. Anyone absent without a legitimate reason such as illness is classified as "unemployed" or a "workplace deserter" and becomes subject to punishment. Enforcement has until now been handled by the Bowiwon (secret police) — but according to recent reports, jurisdiction has shifted to the People's Committee (local government). What is behind this change? A reporting partner living in North Hamgyong Province shared details in early March on the new system for managing workplace attendance. (HONG Mari / KANG Ji-won)

◆ Strong Backlash Against Armed Police Rounding Up Absentees

The reporting partner explained the circumstances behind the transfer of attendance enforcement from the police to the Labor Bureau:

—— How were absentees handled up until now?

If someone was absent without a legitimate reason — illness or a family situation, for instance — for three consecutive days, the workplace would report them to the Anjeongbu (police) as a work refuser. An Anjeongbu mobile unit carrying rifles would track them down at their home or elsewhere and haul them away — no arrest warrant needed. Young officers dragging people off as if they were livestock drew a lot of complaints and criticism. Anyone who wasn't even registered at a workplace was sent directly to a coal mine, construction site, or farm and put to work.

—— How has that changed?

Now it's the People's Committee's Labor Bureau that manages attendance by computer. If someone racks up three consecutive unexcused absences, the system automatically assigns them to wherever the authorities need to fill a labor shortage.

There's talk that one purpose of the new arrangement is to reduce the resentment generated by the old heavy-handed police methods. At the same time, now that the authorities are managing attendance systematically, everyone is being careful not to get caught up in it.

ASIAPRESS has confirmed that North Korean authorities have begun leasing out "small plots" (sotoji) — illegal farmland that individuals had cultivated in mountainous areas, previously confiscated under the pretext of "forest protection" — to institutions and enterprises on the condition that 40% of the harvest be paid as rent. The information was relayed in early March by a reporting partner living in North Hamgyong Province. The stated purpose is for cash-strapped local governments to use the rental income to cover reforestation costs. (JEON Sung-jun / KANG Ji-won)

◆ "Small Plots Leased to Institutions and Enterprises — Not to Individuals"

According to Reporting Partner A in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province, the local People's Committee's Land Management Bureau and the Forestry Management Office have begun distributing usage rights to small plots among institutions and enterprises.

North Korean authorities have in recent years declared annual "forest restoration campaigns," using them as justification to aggressively reclaim the small plots that North Koreans had depended on for their livelihoods. Those same plots are now being handed over to enterprises.

The reporting partner described the situation as follows:
"Starting March 14, the People's Committee's Land Management Bureau — working through the Land Inspection Brigade and the Forestry Management Office — is parceling out some of the small plots that individuals had previously cleared and farmed. It's limited to land within 150 meters of the base of mountain slopes."

Individuals, however, have been entirely excluded from the distribution.

"Individuals aren't eligible. I've heard that the small plots in the Hoeryong area total more than 20 jeongbo [approximately 20 hectares]. Land near farms generally goes to those farms to manage, while the rest is divided up by work unit, though approval from the Land Management Bureau is required first."